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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Along with an increase in cyber security concerns for critical infrastructure applications, 
there is a growing concern and lack of solutions for cyber-based supply chain and device life-
cycle threats. The challenge for this application space is that cost-driven engineering and market 
viability requires the use of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) components or just-in-
time (JIT) manufacturing processes for sub-assemblies most of which originate from unsecured 
foreign facilities.  In addition, many of the deployed embedded system devices are easily 
accessible (i.e. poor physical security) and can easily be tampered with or altered during their 
life-cycle such that the authentication or integrity of the devices cannot be assured.  In this 
research I propose the foundations of a new technology that helps address these growing issues 
with a hardware-based intrusion detection system.  This technology combines the use of an 
analog signal response from a resistor-capacitor circuit and machine learning techniques to not 
only identify the presence of a hardware Trojan on an inter-chip communication bus at 100% 
accuracy for the dataset of over 2000 measurements, but which also correctly distinguishes 
between several types of implanted Trojans at 89% accuracy.  And while this research has 
focused on the security of inter-chip communication, it demonstrates the possibility of using low-
power analog signals for device-level information assurance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Critical infrastructure such as energy delivery systems are characterized by reliability, 
availability, and dependability.  The infrastructures are expected to provide the services 
necessary for daily function of our society regardless of unpredictable changes in their operating 
environment.  And despite only moderate expansion of the infrastructure, our dependencies on 
them are increasing.  We expect them to operate more efficiently, at a lower cost, and also to 
provide the end-users with accurate information on the system’s current status.  All these 
expectations seem to be a driving force behind the smart technologies.  Consequently, the 
societal expectations have caused rapid growth in the communication links between technologies 
(e.g. smart phones, smart appliances, smart meters, etc.).   
Yet the interconnectivity also significantly increases the cybersecurity risks for our 
nation’s critical infrastructures. For example, customer devices linked to the Internet are also 
allowed, by design, to connect to the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) which can alter a 
local power-grid’s load distribution through remote meter disconnects.  So significant 
cybersecurity questions emerge: “Can a customer’s device also control the local energy delivery 
system?” or the inverse “Can a smart meter control customer’s home appliances and resultantly 
affect the load on the power grid?”  A recent report the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) states that “Cybersecurity must encompass not only utility-
owned systems, but some aspects of customer and third party components that interact with the 
grid”[1].  So the need for more cybersecurity solutions comes with an increasing number of 
interconnections.   
In addition, the societal expectations of lower costs have helped transition the electronics 
industry’s supply chain to use components that originate from countries that might have higher 
potentials for cyber crime and known histories of producing counterfeit parts.  These same 
components have made it into safety critical applications and likely into energy delivery systems 
[2].  One primary reason is the challenge of detecting such threats to an embedded system 
device.  While much security research in academia focuses on the upper levels shown in Fig. 1.1, 
it can be stated that the number of trust assumptions is large.  This can basically be summarized 
as the software trusts the hardware to perform as expected.  Yet the fallacy is that there may be 
extra hardware or side channels that leak critical information, none of which can be easily 
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detected by state-of-the art intrusion detection systems that are primarily focused on the 
software/protocol layers.  Ultimately the cyber attack landscapes along with the challenges to 
defend systems are rapidly increasing in complexity.  
  
Figure 1.1: System levels of trust 
1.1 The Importance of Security Research on Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
The primary goal of this research is to help address these growing cybersecurity risks to 
energy delivery systems and in particular those of the AMI domain.  Although there might be 
debate on the criticality of an AMI system, for example the failure of one device might not cause 
catastrophic effects like that experienced in the 2003 Blackout, the importance of the AMI 
system has a much broader impact on society.    The viability of the smart grid depends on the 
AMI system as it is the public face of the smart grid.  It is attached to their homes, the operation 
of an AMI system affects their finances, and it is the mechanism for customers to interact with 
and directly see the promised benefits of the smart grid.  Customers have taken ownership and a 
vested interest in AMI domain without regard for other major improvements to transmission and 
distribution automation equipment.  If an AMI system fails due to reliability issues, business 
management (i.e. demand response pricing), or cyber-attack, then the whole Smart Grid fails in 
the eyes of a customer. 
The AMI domain is also of high technical interest and has significant cybersecurity 
challenges.  The devices are easily accessible with relatively low risk to an attacker (compared to 
high-energy substations).  AMI meters are also networked to both utility resources and customer 
3 
owned resources connected to the Internet, essentially becoming a public gateway into a utility 
control system.  And while the implemented ZigBee Smart Energy communication standards 
provide some cybersecurity safeguards on the wireless communication link, these low-power 
embedded devices likely cannot support industry standard DMZ technology that protects 
corporate networks from Internet-based intrusions.  Similarly, the AMI system is designed to 
allow connection of many smart appliances or heating and cooling control systems, which also 
means that a cyber attacker might be able to gain access to thousands or millions of homes if 
long-lasting protection mechanisms are not designed into the AMI system.  Consequently, this 
large-scale potential violation of privacy means that public trust and confidence of the smart grid 
depends on a secure AMI system. 
Along with an increase in cybersecurity concerns for energy delivery applications, there is 
a growing risk and lack of solutions for cyber-based threats to supply chain and the device 
lifecycle.  The challenge for the AMI application space is that cost-driven engineering and 
market viability requires the use of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) components or 
just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing processes for sub-assemblies, most of which originate from 
unsecured foreign facilities.  In addition, many of the deployed embedded system devices are 
easily accessible (i.e. have poor physical security) and can easily be tampered with or altered 
during their lifecycle such that the authenticity or integrity of the devices cannot be assured.   
1.2 Summary of Key Issues in Supply Chain and Product Lifecycle 
• Backdoors can easily be inserted during just-in-time manufacturing processes or device 
lifecycle. 
• Hardware/software attacks might be latent or intermittent. 
• Hardware attacks may not be visible to software or network IDS (side-channel 
communication). 
1.3 Research Goals 
This research seeks to help solve these growing cybersecurity challenges for critical 
infrastructure systems with innovative solutions that are forward compatible with the increased 
risks and future vulnerabilities.  This project will not only address the current issues of AMI 
system components, but also will help explore solutions that can be pragmatic and cost-
effectively deployed by AMI technology vendors.  And while I focus on advanced metering 
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infrastructure, the results of the work can be broadly applied to energy delivery systems and 
ultimately ensure public trust, confidence and the security of smart grid technologies. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
• Model hardware-intruder based attacks using dynamic response. 
• Create proof-of-concept for low-level intrusion detection system that can identify embedded 
system device hardware eavesdropping and intruders. 
• Perform statistical analysis to determine the optimal model to detect hardware-intruders. 
• Determine several design considerations with regard to IDS sensitivity, accuracy and 
manufacturability. 
1.5 Fundamental Questions 
• Can we detect hardware Trojans? 
• Can our detection mechanisms provide any additional information that helps characterize the 
hardware Trojan? 
• Can we distinguish between Trojan classes?  How do we do this? 
• Will this concept system detect real hardware Trojans? 
• How well does it perform? 
• How do we test this concept: Simulation vs. hardware? 
• How do we analyze the data? 
1.6 Design Challenges 
• Hardware-based IDS solution must be low-cost in order for industry to use technology on 
AMI devices. 
• Hardware-based IDS solution must not have significant impact on the AMI device or 
network performance. 
• Analog circuit components degrade independently over time and are also susceptible to 
changes in the operating environment. 
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CHAPTER 2 CYBERSECURITY ISSUES IN CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPLY CHAIN AND DEVICE 
LIFECYCLE  
 
2.1 Lifecycle of an Embedded System Device 
In order to comprehend the complexities and vulnerabilities of an embedded system device 
that will become part of our nation’s critical infrastructure, we must first understand the 
engineering process for a typical device from inception of idea through end-of-life disposal.  
This process is commonly known as a product lifecycle.  Although there are many different 
models used by industry and business development experts to characterize and manage a product 
lifecycle (e.g waterfall, agile development, etc.), it can be generalized into six phases: 1) concept, 
2) design, 3) supply chain management, 4) production, 5) operation, and 6) disposal as shown in 
Fig. 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Typical device lifecycle 
Although in many business practices, the order of the product lifecycle phases are not 
strictly adhered to, the generalization in Fig. 2.1 shows some sequential dependencies between 
phases.  The concept phase includes the initial development of the product idea and a system 
requirements assessment along with a preliminary market survey.  The design phase includes all 
the hardware and software design and the selection of specific components to use.  The design 
phase is usually iteratively active through product release so that it can support or redesign any 
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issues that arise from fielding the devices.  The design phase usually includes many cycles of 
validation and verification testing of the product and may even include a controlled pre-release 
of the product to get real usage information and to help identify unforeseeable design flaws so 
they can be corrected before a general release of the product. 
Once the components are specified in the design phase, supply chain management 
activities begin to evaluate and vet potential suppliers and to secure longer-term contracts as a 
just-in-time (JIT) supplier or for a product lifetime purchase of components.  In FDA regulated 
medical devices, manufacturers are required to support their products approximately seven years 
beyond the end of production, so contracts with riders for lifetime purchase of parts is common.  
Critical infrastructure devices currently do not have this stringent requirement of maintenance 
support, although many vendors offer long-term or lifetime warranties of their products given the 
initial cost of investment for infrastructure owners.  Although it is not well characterized in Fig. 
2.1, the supply chain management of a product, or at least the procurement records, may exist 
many years after the end of production and makes this phase the most complex of a product 
lifecycle. 
The production phase can be described by months to years of preparation, tool 
modification, process validation and verification, statistical process control, quality management, 
and many other aspects that are traditionally incorporated into the discipline of industrial 
engineering.  Much planning on the aforementioned topics occurs before the first full production 
run.  Quality management in particular drives many of the common practices for manufacturing 
production as technology vendors seek to have a highly repeatable production process and to 
maintain their ISO certifications (ISO 9001, ISO 14001, ISO 27001).  Much like supply chain 
management, the production phase is an on-going effort throughout the lifecycle of the product. 
The operation phase includes shipping and receiving of new devices, installation and 
deployment of the infrastructure, and continuous operation by the asset owners.  Many devices 
may actually be fielded for more than 20 years.  A major challenge in the operation phase is 
deploying a new system.  The infrastructure owners need to deploy the equipment and bring it 
online without disrupting existing services to their customers.  Additionally, if an early device 
failure occurs, the owners must put into effect their contingency plans.  During this phase, 
devices are exposed to unpredictable environmental changes and system stressors including 
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cyber events that are usually not well modeled during the device design, despite best efforts.  
This operation phase is a true test of a system’s reliability. 
The final phase in a product lifecycle, disposal, begins when a device reaches the end of its 
life, needs to be replaced with newer technology, or becomes obsolete.  Current practice is to 
remove devices from service, sometimes send them to the manufacturer for a recycling discount 
on new equipment, or send them to general electronics recycling centers after marring or 
removing outer marking such as utility names, serial numbers, etc.  It is unknown what becomes 
of these devices after they are sent for recycling, although there is a strong possibility that the 
circuit boards will be extracted for the metals while the components end up in the secondary 
markets [3]. 
Each phase in a product lifecycle has its own cybersecurity challenges and may require 
different mitigation techniques.  This is why cybersecurity of the supply chain is very complex 
and very costly to manufacturers.  For example, the disposal phase is typically overlooked during 
the development of a cybersecurity program.  The challenge of the disposal phase is that the 
devices operating in critical infrastructure environments may still contain sensitive information 
in their non-volatile memory.  Yet utility operators may not have the appropriate equipment or 
budget to access individual ICs within a device and erase all non-volatile memories.  Another 
challenge is that administrators and public utilities will have difficulty justifying large costs 
related to specialized disposal of devices primarily because it does not increase the level of 
service to their constituents.  This is the same struggle for cybersecurity programs in general. 
While many manufacturers accept a “trade-in” of the old devices, even ones from other 
manufacturers, there are no established guidelines of how an asset owner should sanitize the old 
equipment of sensitive information.  Even new standardizations with extensive guidelines and 
security controls such as the recent NIST Special Publication 800-53 do not account for proper 
disposal of devices that might contain sensitive information [4].  Furthermore, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security recommends that government 
entities need to “Establish guidance for the proper destruction, recycling, and/or disposal of 
electronic parts and systems” [2], yet utilities will run into similar budgetary justification issues 
to implement guidelines without the notion of regulatory compliance and the associated fines for 
non-compliance. 
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2.2 Supply Chain Concerns: A Real Problem 
“Last May, customs officials at the Port of Long Beach, Calif., intercepted a shipment of 
almost $1 million worth of fake SanDisk memory chips stashed inside nearly 2,000 
karaoke machines, shipped in a container from a foreign country” [5]. 
 
Cybersecurity for the supply chain is a real problem.  As demonstrated by this section’s 
leading quote describing a 2011 event, supply chain risk mitigation (SCRM) is not solely a 
matter of protecting the financial information, contracts, design documents (including software 
and hardware) or even configuration data.  There are many documented cases where counterfeit 
parts have infiltrated the supply chain of critical applications.  Yet the generalized problem is 
much greater: if counterfeit parts can enter the supply chain either through forward (upstream) or 
backward (product returns or buy back) channels, what other well-crafted cyber vulnerabilities 
can be introduced through these same channels?  This problem is not specific to military 
applications.  A 2010 industry assessment reports that industrial/commercial and high reliability–
industrial, which encompass critical infrastructure and energy delivery systems, were among the 
top categories in counterfeits incidents [2]. 
Consequently, supply chain risk mitigation must focus on prevention and detection, 
although neither of which are trivial.  Prevention through stringent supplier evaluation, 
component traceability and legislative oversight may be the best defense against counterfeit parts 
[5], yet the cost to maintain such a program can be prohibitive.  On the other hand, the detection 
of counterfeit parts or hardware and software Trojans could potentially be automated within a 
manufacturer’s validation and verification testing process, yet technical solutions scarcely exist.  
An alarming fact in the 2010 report “Defense Industrial Base Assessment: Counterfeit 
Electronics” [2] states that circuit board assemblers who manufacture device subsystems, did not 
discover the counterfeit parts – they were primarily discovered after the parts had been returned 
as defective (see Fig. IV-7 and Fig. IV-8 shown in the report).  It is possible that circuit board 
assemblers simply do not have the capability (staff, equipment or budget) to detect counterfeits, 
as similar testing of reliability, qualification, and verification requires a large effort [6][7].  
Perhaps the counterfeit parts could have been detected sooner if inexpensive, automated and 
proven technical solutions existed. 
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Parts obsolescence and availability are also major concerns for supply chain risk 
management.  For example, the technical and security risks increase if a power utility procures 
highly specialized equipment for specific systems, yet the “technology manufacturer ceases to 
provide replacement parts because technology has advanced since that equipment was fielded” 
[6].  The same issues can arise when a device manufacturer contracts a semiconductor company 
to design and fabricate application specific ICs, although in some cases the device manufacturer 
will opt for a lifetime buy based on the expected life of their devices.  For this reason some 
technical reports state that availability rather than cost is the major driver toward the use of 
COTS components and ICs [7]. 
2.3 Supplier Evaluation and Vetting 
In a supply chain domain, the evaluation and selection of suppliers are an important first 
step to mitigate risks.  An evaluation of supplier business practices along with process control 
information and quality engineering documents help identify risks or supply chain 
vulnerabilities.  Mitigation of the risks can be enforced through contracts, but the challenge still 
resides in the detection of low-quality, counterfeit, or subverted parts to show a breach of the 
contract.  Supplier evaluation processes have evolved over the last several decades with efforts 
focused on critical government systems and are slowly surfacing in commercial markets that 
furnish our nation’s critical infrastructure such as the telecom industry or energy delivery 
systems.  Out of these extended efforts, several guidelines on best practices have been published 
by DoD, DOE, and the U.S. Department of Commerce.  A good example of this is the 1996 DoD 
guidelines for evaluating original equipment manufacturers (OEM) shown below.  And while it 
is dated, the general recommendations still hold true. 
 
DoD OEMs Supplier Evaluation Guidelines (circa 1996): [7] 
• Use qualified suppliers and parts (previously qualified to MIL-SPEC).  
• Use silicon die characterized for mil/industrial grades.  
• Assure design margin (the subject of several best practices). 
• Use circuit simulation and modeling.  
• Ask supplier if parts will work in your application.  
• Talk to other users.  
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• Record all information on a given part.  
• Take advantage of new technology.  
• Ring out and eliminate problems with environmental stress screening approach.   
 
A DOE report from 2008 describes more complete process for supplier selection and 
COTS components into critical government systems [8].  One of the core technologies is the 
Enterprise Component Information System (eCIS) which tracks detailed component information, 
testing results, and failure analysis information.  The eCIS also provides a framework to track the 
COTS component insertion process shown in Fig. 2.2 and helps ensure the rigorous engineering 
practices needed to reduce supply chain risks [8]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Typical supply chain component insertion process, highlighting the higher risks 
that occur with inconsistent supply chain surveillance and monitoring 
While most manufacturers follow a similar process for supply chain management during 
initial product development, there usually is a significant lack in surveillance and monitoring 
activities of the incoming components (i.e. random audits or destructive testing).  In terms of 
cybersecurity this means that counterfeit or subverted parts can easily be inserted into the supply 
chain after a manufacturer begins a full production run.  Conclusively, surveillance and 
monitoring of the supply chain is crucial to ensure the security of critical infrastructure and 
energy delivery systems despite the significant costs.  This re-emphasizes one goal of this 
research: to create cybersecurity solutions that are pragmatic and cost-effective. 
2.4 Existing Practices for Functional Verification Testing 
In a manufacturing environment there are several forms of verification testing that can 
occur as a device is being assembled with the primary goal to ensure the system is functional and 
meets the design specifications.  Verification testing is usually performed in phases depending on 
the predetermined test plan and the specific industry.  For example, medical devices which are 
regulated by the FDA are required to go through visual inspection, automated testing of the 
electronics and software interfaces, burn-in or other environmental testing (similar to that 
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specified by MIL-STD-810 [9]), and testing on the final assembly.  The testing typically includes 
electrical continuity tests and digital interface testing at a minimum. 
At each phase the data is typically recorded and maintained as specified by the 
manufacturer’s records and retention schedule, although in some cases it might be a simple 
pass/fail rather than details of the measurement results.  If a device passes all the testing, it is 
packaged and sent to the distributors or end-users.  If a device fails any manufacturing test or 
inspection, it is typically routed to an internal “rework” team who review the test data, determine 
the possible cause, and manually replace a faulty component.  These repaired devices are again 
sent through the verification testing process which hopefully results in successful results, 
although sometimes it results in one or two more rework cycles before the faulty device is 
destroyed.  In the event of a fielded device failure, a manufacturer will usually initiate a formal 
investigation that analyzes the verification test data, procurement information, and possibly 
perform additional tests to help determine a root cause.  If the device was a lower-cost device not 
designed for a critical application, a manufacturer may forego failure analysis because of a cost-
benefit determination. 
While many of the generic testing process steps are listed in a number of quality 
management systems or standards like ISO 9001, it is up to the test engineer to design a test plan 
that fits the guidelines to a specific device and industry.  Some industries, such as avionics flight 
control systems, require rigorous testing on software and hardware to ensure coverage as well as 
system interactions and timing.  In contrast, consumer products may only go through a minimal 
set of final verification testing, primarily to ensure basic functionality, and will have strong 
reliance on the initial validation, reliability and qualification testing performed before the start of 
production.  Again there is much dependence on decisions of the responsible test engineer(s).   
In theory the test engineer of a robust system will test all specified interfaces and 
operational states of the device, taking into account the combinatorial possibilities of each input 
(e.g. a brute-force approach), but in practice that is too costly and time consuming.  However, 
there has been much research in the testing domain examining the best approaches to identify 
critical parameters or combinations that are likely to have a large effect on the system.  These 
include well-established statistical design of experiment techniques like response surface 
methods [10] and robust parameter design (i.e. Taguchi methodology) using orthogonal arrays of 
test parameters [11].  Yet, current engineering hiring practices do not support the use of such 
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testing methods, by hiring less experienced engineers (with only an undergraduate degree) to 
design and perform the system test while allocating the senior engineers to design the system or 
safety critical software.  The challenge is that junior engineers may not have the academic 
background to fully understand the advanced statistical testing methods and typically lack the 
experience or integrity gained through years of mentorship to perform the rigorous testing 
required by critical applications in avionics, aerospace, telecommunications, and energy delivery 
systems that have an up-time of many years. 
2.5 Just-in-Time Manufacturing 
One of the most problematic areas in supply chain is the trichotomy between cost, 
schedule, and reliability.  This tension is well enumerated by Shaw, Speyerer, and Sandborn’s 
2010 commissioned report to Defense Microelectronics Activity (the U.S government’s authority 
on microelectronics obsolescence focused on DoD applications) which assigns cost and time 
metrics associated with resolving supply chain issues [12].  The comprehensive report indicates 
that the mean cost for a manufacturer to select an alternate source for a part is $41,000 and only 
takes an average of 11 weeks to resolve.  In contrast the mean cost for a design change required 
by selecting another comparable COTS component is $1,118,000 and can take an average of 42 
weeks to resolve.  Simply stated, using alternate suppliers (including those who have not been 
thoroughly evaluated) significantly reduces cost, time, and ultimately lost revenue. 
In order to help alleviate the pressures of cost, schedule, and reliability many 
manufacturers have adopted a just-in-time manufacturing (JIT) business model and use lean or 
six-sigma techniques to further increase quality and reduce manufacturing costs [13].  Taiichi 
Ōno first established the JIT concept in his post-World War II development of the Toyota 
production system: “Just-in-time means that, in a flow process, the right parts needed in 
assembly reach the assembly line at the time they are needed and only in the amount needed,” 
[14][15].  And while terms like “kanban” still depict the original system, the JIT model has 
evolved to a business model with goals to approach a “stockless production” and reduce the 
amount of stored inventory [16].  For modern manufacturers this means they only maintain small 
or moderate sized lots from their suppliers, only enough to buffer the unpredictability in shipping 
or upstream supply chain.   
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To give a specific example, one manufacturer of critical infrastructure devices uses an off-
site supplier to build sub-assembly circuit boards and maintains enough stock to buffer a two-
week delay in parts.  The primary supplier of the circuit boards then uses secondary suppliers or 
brokers of individual components such as transistors, ICs, capacitors, and power regulators and 
similarly maintain minimal parts inventory.  Each supplier might have a two-week supply of 
already assembled parts ready to ship to their customer, the device manufacturer, again to 
accommodate a minimal interruption of the supply chain.  The device manufacturer will perform 
a final assembly of all parts from their suppliers, and then perform function verification testing 
on the final product.  The testing usually occurs immediately prior to placing the products in a 
temporary storage before shipping to the end user, although in some cases of a longer shelf time 
the manufacturer will test the devices again before shipping to make sure a current verification 
test is recorded.   
2.6 Vulnerabilities in the Supply Chain 
In terms of supply chain vulnerabilities for our nation’s critical infrastructure, if a device 
manufacturer’s normal supply chain becomes disrupted most will likely select an alternate source 
due to the lower cost and less down-time.  By using an alternate supplier who is not part of the 
regular JIT value stream, there are significant risks of delay and cost if the normal supplier 
evaluation and vetting process were required.  Consequently, a manufacturer might decide to use 
a less comprehensive supplier evaluation, despite the additional risks of component reliability or 
counterfeit part insertion.  A mitigation for this issue, and one that is in common practice for 
FDA regulated medical devices, is to randomly or selectively use components or subsystems 
from multiple suppliers during a regular manufacturing run.   
While the methodology to have supplier redundancy provides diversity and less 
dependency on a single point of failure in the supply chain, it still does not mitigate issues or 
subversive actions that occur further upstream.  For example, a primary supplier who builds a 
subsystem circuit board might also make the same risky decision of using an unevaluated 
alternate supplier of components due to similar pressures of cost and time.  In addition, if one of 
the primary suppliers is a parts broker offering similar redundancy in secondary suppliers, the 
supply chain risk increases; parts brokers, independent distributors, and Internet-exclusive 
sources were identified as the top three supply chain sources of counterfeit parts [5][2].  One 
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particular example of this danger is the 2010 federal prosecution of the integrated circuit broker, 
VisionTech, who was convicted in a conspiracy that sold hundreds of thousands of counterfeit 
ICs to the U.S. Navy, defense contractors, and others [17][18][19]. 
It is expected that a critical infrastructure device manufacturer evaluate the secondary 
suppliers at the beginning of a new device’s design lifecycle, but reoccurring audits of the 
upstream supply chain are very costly and are likely not to have occurred with enough frequency 
to ensure the authenticity and reliability of the final assembly.  The supply chain risk for a JIT 
manufacturing environment can be modeled as shown in Fig. 2.3, although it does not 
characterize all the security implications.  One such example not shown is the vulnerability of a 
temporarily shelved device that has undergone verification testing, yet has not been shipped to 
the customer.  Within the given lag time between final verification test and shipment, the 
hardware or software could be altered.   
 
Figure 2.3: JIT supply chain risk model (does not show the vulnerabilities introduced by 
product returns or excess inventory buy back practices) 
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A similar vulnerability can occur between the receiving time and contracted installation of 
a new smart grid deployment, such as an AMI system, where the supplier or device manufacturer 
will contract with a regional service to warehouse devices and perform the installation so that 
regular infrastructure or utility staff are not overwhelmed with the deployment.  Ultimately this 
means that due to cost and time constraints there are more opportunities for a sophisticated cyber 
adversary to insert a hardware or software backdoor into the supply chain without being 
detected.  This is a significant problem for cybersecurity. 
Another alarming vulnerability in the supply chain and perhaps the easiest to overlook are 
the risks introduced by returned parts or excess inventory buy-back programs.  It is standard 
business practice for suppliers and parts distributors to accept returns from the device 
manufacturers or circuit board assemblers or to buy back their unused inventory.  Part of this 
practice is encouraged for reasons of good customer service and long-term business 
relationships.  Although there are usually strict guidelines on the returned product such as 
maintenance of the appropriate environmental controls (e.g. proper humidity or electrostatic 
discharge protection) and sometimes requirements for unopened packaging, it is still possible for 
“customers to purchase counterfeit parts from another source and, knowingly or unknowingly, 
return those parts to the original component manufacturer” [2].  Not only does this highlight an 
alternate channel for counterfeit parts to enter the supply chain, it also emphasizes the 
importance of proper testing and screening of returned parts before placing them back into a 
supplier’s inventory. 
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CHAPTER 3 EMBEDDED SYSTEMS HARDWARE 
THREAT MODEL 
 
3.1 Overview 
While the discussion on cybersecurity issues with the supply chain highlight potential 
paths or vectors of inserting a hardware Trojan (used synonymously with hardware intruder), it 
now becomes necessary to describe specifics of the hardware intrusion problem which this 
research attempts to address.  To summarize, this chapter will discuss previous work on 
taxonomies of hardware-based Trojans, fully describe this research’s specific threat model to 
embedded systems, and discuss several approaches to detect hardware intruders. 
3.2 Taxonomy of Hardware-Based Cyber Attacks  
Although there has been much previous work on hardware Trojan taxonomy [20–23] with 
respect to integrated circuits, they must be reduced to a simplistic form in order to describe a 
hardware-based attack on an embedded system.  In the reduced description a hardware-based 
intruder can be classified by three main categories summarized in Fig. 3.1: 1) physical 
characteristics, 2) trigger or activation mechanisms, and 3) action characteristics [21].  The 
physical characteristics are described by circuit size, distribution, layout structure, and type – 
parametric or functional.  It is expected that the physical characteristics will also have some 
effect on the electrical behaviors of the system.  A Trojan’s activation mechanism or trigger is 
perhaps the most difficult to uncover during forensic analysis.  The trigger can be through 
internal state-based monitoring or from external activation over covert radio communication.  
The final category describes the actions taken by the Trojan which could be to transmit data or 
modify the system’s functionality. 
 
Figure 3.1: Simplified taxonomy of hardware Trojans 
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3.3 Threat Model for Embedded Systems Hardware 
Despite similarities with much of the existing research on hardware Trojans, hardware-
based cyber-attacks on embedded system devices are more achievable by a lesser capable 
adversary.  For example an extra COTS IC with integrated RF communication can be added with 
minimal effort to an embedded system device by soldering a few wires.  This inclusion can be 
performed at any time in the device lifecycle, especially during final assembly or post-
deployment.  The threats of such an attack, and the primary focus of this research, are centered 
on unprotected inter-chip communication, data that can be extracted from it, and the possibility 
of controlling a system through the communication bus (Fig.  3.2).  Examples of this include 
acquiring power usage data, activating remote disconnects, using the mesh network to corrupt a 
utility’s enterprise computing system, or even controlling customer-owned home area networked 
devices and smart appliances.  These attacks might focus on a target facility or might propagate 
through the AMI network.  Even worse, if the hardware Trojan was installed during 
manufacturing, then it might be possible to capture extremely sensitive information such as 
cryptographic variables or configuration data used during the enrollment of a cryptographic-IC, 
such as a trusted platform module (TPM). 
 
Figure 3.2: Inter-chip communication bus monitor threat 
The action characteristics of an embedded system hardware Trojan primarily fit into two 
types of attacks: passive eavesdropping or active command or control of the communication bus.  
In terms of the previously discussed taxonomy, these would fall under transmit information 
(passive attack) and modify function (active attack).  Both forms of attack can be implemented 
with COTS hardware with multiple activation mechanisms, giving it much flexibility and also 
highlighting the danger of such a threat.  First, the Trojan device might capture information 
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based on active inter-chip communication using an edge trigger transistor configuration.  The 
second activation would occur from an external trigger over a covert RF communication link 
which then transmits the captured data.  The same RF communication link could be used to 
initiate a carefully designed active attack that propagates from the inter-chip communication bus 
to the front-end microprocessor and out through the AMI network. 
Hardware-based cyber attacks can be modeled in three domains: digital, analog and 
temporal (Fig. 3.3).  Each can provide characteristic information about the attack mechanisms 
and associated hardware, but none can fully represent an attack.  The digital domain is perhaps 
the easiest to model since the information will be in a discrete binary or state-based form.  The 
problem of modeling hardware attacks solely within the digital domain is that certain attacks 
might be implemented using noisy analog signals or electromagnetic waveforms.  The analog 
domain characterizes an attack through analysis of signals, electrical characteristics, power and 
heat dissipation, and most continuous values that can be measured on an embedded system.  The 
temporal domain looks at the timing characteristics such as latencies or clock signals in both the 
digital and analog domains and the associated timing attacks.  This research primarily focuses on 
the analog domain. 
 
Figure 3.3: Hardware attack modeling domains 
From an engineering and implementation perspective, the type of attack and the physical 
insertion point will determine the type of hardware circuit used by the adversary and 
consequently the attack model.  The easiest example is a hardware Trojan implemented using a 
COTS microcontroller that has I/O and analog sampling capabilities.  An active attack as 
previously described will use the I/O capabilities to sink or source the inter-chip communication 
bus to initiate the attack.  To drive an I/O pin, a microcontroller’s internal hardware typically 
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uses a CMOS inverter as shown in Fig. 3.4 (a) which consists of paired PMOS and NMOS 
transistors along with a capacitor to maintain the pin’s output voltage level. 
(a)   (b)  
Figure 3.4: CMOS inverter (a) and equivalent circuit (b) 
In the context of observing the electrical characteristics of such an intruder it is more 
practical to analyze the equivalent circuit model shown in Fig. 3.4 (b) and the dynamic power 
dissipation.  The total energy dissipation (dynamic power) of the inverter has dependencies of 
transistor switching rate, output capacitance and the drain voltage [24]: 
   (3.1) 
So when considering hardware detection techniques, it is expected that a CMOS inverter Trojan 
might have observable characteristics similar (not identical) to standard resistor-capacitor (RC) 
circuit. 
A hardware Trojan circuit might also use a unity-gain voltage-follower configuration 
operational amplifier (op amp) to reduce its electrical effects on the circuit under measurement.  
The voltage-follower configuration shown in Fig. 3.5 is also known as an output buffer and is 
very common in sensor designs such as medical devices, audio applications, or other signal 
processing applications.  The high input impedance of the op amp reduces the amount of current 
drawn from the circuit, and combines with a current gain stage so the output can drive a system 
where the output has a large capacitance or resistive load.  In other words, the Trojan will be able 
to sense voltage or logic values on a communication bus possibly without having a large 
electrical footprint.  Fortunately there are several parasitic electrical characteristics of 
commercial op amps that can affect the communication bus, and can possibly be used to identify 
its presence.  Although there are many transistor-level implementations of an op amp, including 
MOS-based [25] and monolithic bipolar junction transistor (BJT) op amps [26], each input node 
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has transistor junction characteristics such as the input resistance and capacitance [27] that are 
externally measurable. 
 
Figure 3.5: Op amp in a voltage-follower configuration 
3.4 Approaches to Hardware Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
In general there are several well-established principles to intrusion detection and 
prevention such as those discussed by NIST Special Publication 800-94 Guide to Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) [28].  The primary goal is for the system to 
automatically respond to a detected threat by attempting to prevent it from succeeding.  The 
detection methodologies typically fit into or a combination of three main classes: signature-
based, anomaly-based, and stateful protocol analysis.  The cyber response will vary based 
primarily on the mission of the monitored system and reliability aspects of the architecture.  For 
example, blocking all enterprise network traffic from a general purpose desktop computer with 
suspected malicious activity may be of no consequence.  In contrast, blocking all traffic from an 
industrial controller that regulates a high consequence process within a chemical plant could be 
disastrous.   
NIST Special Publication 800-94 further defines the detection methodologies.  Signature-
based detection compare known threat signatures (usually static definitions) to observed events.  
Anomaly-based detection compare definitions or signatures of normal activity against observed 
events to identify significant deviations.  Stateful protocol analysis compares deviations of 
observed events to predetermined profiles of benign protocol activity for each protocol state.  In 
addition, a promising newer approach called specification-based detection consisting of 
identifying deviations from a correct behavior profile predefined using logical specifications has 
been successfully applied to an AMI emulation environment or proposed for Home Area 
Networks [29–31].  The distinction between stateful protocol analysis and specification-based 
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detection is that one focuses strictly on communication protocol, while the later works by 
building a state machine of a process, and then monitoring activity to check whether anything 
escapes from the system boundaries previously specified.   
But regardless of the detection methodology, the overall challenge is to apply the IDPS 
principles to a complex hardware threat model that captures the supply chain insertion, analog 
signal characteristics, digital logic, and timing characteristics.  A recently presented approach 
proposes the use of ring oscillator circuits within an IC to capture timing characteristics of a 
probing attack on an input pin [32].  While this approach focuses on attacks to an IC, it is very 
similar to the hardware threat model on an inter-chip communication bus.  Yet the detection 
system requires more internal hardware on a custom ASIC and only looks at the binary result of 
comparing phase delays (delay or no delay) rather than additional information like wave shape 
perturbations, peak voltages, etc.   
More promising techniques for hardware Trojan detection include a signature-based 
technique that uses noise modeling to construct fingerprints for an IC family utilizing side-
channel information such as power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) profiles [33].  
Another technique that can help identify device cloning or counterfeit ICs uses passive monitors 
and exploits unintentional RF emissions to build statistical fingerprints and the associated 
classifier system [34][35].  A third research area is focused on using process variations and 
measurable properties of physical unclonable functions (PUF) which offer many techniques and 
applications such as authentication, integrity testing, counterfeit identification, and cryptographic 
functions without the vulnerabilities of preprogrammed signatures in non-volatile memory [36].  
Due to complex manufacturing process variations and the extreme difficulty to replicate them, 
the physical function becomes unclonable.  An optical beam, electrical signal, or other challenge 
is induced on the system which then produces an unpredictable physical response and yet is 
repeatable (with some noise compensation).  Depending on the possible challenges, a PUF has 
the capability to produce a high-order number of signatures called challenge-response pairs 
which identify unique characteristics of a specific system. 
To summarize, there are many approaches to intrusion detection and not one of them 
provides a complete solution.  Ultimately the best solution will account for possible insertions 
into the supply chain and span the analog, digital, and temporal domains to provide a much more 
complete view of the system’s security posture.  
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CHAPTER 4 HARDWARE-BASED INTRUSION 
DETECTION USING RESISTOR-CAPACITOR 
CIRCUITS: A NEW APPROACH 
 
4.1 Description of Hardware 
A novel approach for intrusion detection on an inter-chip communication bus is to use 
resistive-capacitive (RC) circuits which have been designed to give a dynamic response to a 
binary challenge (single-bit or multi-bit square wave).  Statistical perturbations to the waveform 
indicate that an intruder is present.  In particular the circuit is an appropriately sized two-stage 
resistor-capacitor filter circuit as described by [37].  The RC circuit is connected to the 
communication bus via a low-resistance analog switch which is controlled by one of the 
embedded system’s microprocessor.  Signal perturbations of the dynamic response waveforms 
are monitored at the positive nodes of each capacitor, V1 and V2, using a two-channel analog-to-
digital converter (ADC) module that is part of the microprocessor’s peripheral I/O capabilities.  
The intrusion detection hardware configuration is shown in Fig. 4.1 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Intrusion detection system hardware 
The single-pole double-throw (SPDT) analog switch has low charge injection and low total 
harmonic distortion (THD) which allows signals from the inter-chip communication bus to 
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propagate through the switch with minimal signal loss.  The sampling rate of the ADC hardware 
must be fast enough to capture the metrics as discussed in upcoming sections without decreasing 
the performance of the intrusion detection model.  The initial system was tested using low 
resolution (8-bit), so it is expected that any ADC with higher resolution (10-bit, 12-bit, etc.) will 
offer at least the same performance as long as the sampling rate meets the minimum 
requirements for the detection model.  This research has not studied the effects of using different 
ADC technologies such as successive approximation register (SAR) or sigma-delta, although 
final system integration needs to select the ADC technology that performs best with the specific 
embedded system and intrusion detection model [38]. 
4.2 Concept of Operation 
This intrusion detection system is centered on the concept of challenge-response 
authentication which is prevalent in modern trusted computing systems.  To summarize the 
concept, a verifier will send a challenge to the device under test (DUT) and the system should 
respond correctly within an appropriate tolerance.  Many of the computer security applications 
which use a challenge-response concept focus on digital responses or cryptographic functions.  
In contrast, this intrusion detection system induces a challenge using the physical properties of 
resistor-capacitor circuits along with principles of energy conservation, and measures electrical 
characteristics of the system’s dynamic power response.  Of course the current system being 
studied is the inter-chip communication bus, but the concept of this intrusion detection system 
can be applied to nearly all low-power electronic devices. 
During normal operation, the analog switch will connect the RC circuit to the 
communication bus,1 allowing the capacitors to charge at a rate determined by the time constant 
τ = RC = (equivalent resistance)*(equivalent capacitance).  V1 and V2 are monitored during the 
connected state, and the response signals are then compared to the disconnected state where the 
capacitors are discharging with a natural exponential decay response.  Due to well-understood 
physical properties of an RC circuit and by selecting a balanced design where R1 ≈ R2 and C1 ≈ 
C2, the charge and discharge cycles without an intruder have similar rates of decay (which can 
be shown with a simple linear transformation of the signal about the horizontal axis).  It is 
expected that the per-cycle (charge-discharge cycle) comparisons along with a sliding window 
                                                 
1 This research primarily uses the I2C communication bus which is at VCC during its idle state, but the concepts 
presented herein are applicable to other communication protocols and buses. 
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comparison of the previous n-cycles will indicate any significant signal perturbations caused by a 
hardware intruder.   
4.3 Intrusion Detection Measurements 
While both channels of the ADC are used to monitor and capture the voltage-time data of 
the capacitors in the RC circuit, there are a number of metrics both measured and derived to 
indicate the presence of an intruder.  Some measurements are voltage or time data, others include 
first-derivative functions (interval slopes) or integral functions (areas under the curve).  In 
addition, some of the metrics used are simple incremental counts.  Table 4.1 describes examples 
of metrics used in this system to help build and refine an accurate IDS model.  
A simpler approach to detecting intruders on a communication bus would be to sample the 
bus for unexpected logic level changes during idle periods or wait until the data packets are 
delivered to the application/protocol layer.  Yet this approach has several disadvantages.  The 
first of which is that detection using this approach has a strong dependency on a hardware Trojan 
to actively use the communication bus.  If an intruder were passively “eavesdropping” and 
collecting system data as described in Chapter 3, then the logic-level monitoring approach would 
fail.  So this simpler detection approach is only effective for active bus usage, which might only 
occur as a zero-day attack and could be too late.  A second disadvantage is that the logic-level 
monitoring is scheduled, which, if it is periodic, an adversary could simply decide to initiate an 
active attack on the system during an unscheduled time period.  Randomizing the logic-level 
monitoring would help address this problem, but still is susceptible to the first disadvantage 
mentioned.  The intrusion detection system must use dynamic response characteristics to capture 
both the passive and active attacks. 
4.4 System Integration 
From systems perspective, the integration of this RC-circuit-based intrusion detection 
system is well suited for existing critical infrastructure embedded devices.  In particular, this IDS 
technology can easily be engineered into an existing AMI smart meter’s design.  Most 
microprocessors that are used for embedded systems are COTS devices with many general 
purpose I/O functions, one of which is ADC peripheral hardware.  In addition the footprint of the 
other components (resistors, capacitors, and analog switch) have minimal space requirements on 
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a printed circuit board or can be included as a basic block in an application-specific integrated 
circuit (ASIC). 
 
Table 4.1: Description of metrics used for intrusion detection 
Type of 
Measurement 
Name Units Description 
Discrete 
Components 
"Cap" farad Nominal capacitance of C1 & C2 on the IDS 
module. 
"Res" ohm Nominal resistance of R1 & R2 on the IDS 
module. 
Voltage 
Measurements 
"V1pk"  V Peak voltage of C1 during a measurement cycle. 
"V2pk"  V Peak voltage of C2 during a measurement cycle. 
Time Measurements "V1pkToIDSoff" second Time difference between peak voltage of C1 and 
the transition edge from charge cycle to discharge 
cycle (as monitored by the analog switch’s control 
signal). 
"V2pkToIDSoff" second Same as "V1pkToIDSoff" except using C2 peak 
voltage. 
Interval Slopes  
(First-derivative) 
"SDslopeV1_OnOff" V/10µs Standard deviation on the difference between 
interval slope i of the charge cycle and the 
transform of interval slope i of the discharge cycle.  
Interval slopes are acquired with a 300 kHz 
sampling rate. 
"SDslopeV2_OnOff"  V/10µs Same as "SDslopeV1_OnOff" except using C2 
voltage-time measurements. 
"SlopeV1qty" integer Count of the number of interval slopes less than a 
predetermined threshold (initial threshold set to 0) 
"SlopeV2qty" integer Same as "SlopeV1qty" except using C2 interval 
slopes. 
Area Under Curves 
(Integral function) 
"AreaV1on" V·s Area under the curve during capacitor C1 charge 
cycle 
"AreaV2on" V·s Area under the curve during capacitor C2 charge 
cycle 
"AreaV1V2on" V·s Difference between the area under curves V1 and 
V2 during the charge cycle. 
"AreaV1off" V·s Area under the curve during capacitor C1 
discharge cycle 
"AreaV2off" V·s Area under the curve during capacitor C2 
discharge cycle 
"AreaV1V2off" V·s Difference between the area under curves V1 and 
V2 during the discharge cycle. 
"AreaV1V2_OnOff" V·s Difference between "AreaV1V2on" and 
"AreaV2off" 
"AreaV1_OnOff" V·s Difference between "AreaV1on" and "AreaV1off" 
"AreaV2_OnOff" V·s Difference between "AreaV2on" and "AreaV2off" 
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The intrusion detection algorithm resides on one of the system’s microprocessors and uses 
the voltage-time data from the two-channel ADC module to detect a hardware intruder.  In some 
cases a reduced algorithm may be run to identify the presence of an intruder, then a more costly 
algorithm is run to characterize the intruder for attribution or to verify a false positive (if the 
specificity of the system is tuned to allow more false positives while reducing false negatives).  
Upon detection, an intruder flag is raised and informs the rest of the system, such as other on-
board microprocessors or software services, through a simple message passing interface (serial, 
parallel, or internal interface).  In the case of an AMI smart meter, the message of a hardware 
intruder would be propagated through the AMI mesh network radios using the ANSI C12.22 
protocol and inform the power utility operators of a cyber event (Fig. 4.2).  The message 
propagation would be similar to a smart meter’s existing tamper detection or tilt-sensor message 
[39].  Upon detection of an intruder, the embedded device’s software can be configured to 
execute under probation [40] such that only a minimal set of operations on the device are 
permitted like sampling and transmitting power usage data.  In this reduced state, operations like 
firmware upgrades, encryption key updates, or device enrollment in the mesh network would not 
be allowed to execute. 
 
Figure 4.2: Intrusion detection data and control flow 
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4.5 Example Use Cases 
One use case for this IDS technology is to build an external IDS circuit and create the 
accompanying test routine which becomes part of the functional verification testing at the device 
manufacturing facility.  Although this scheme will not provide on-going integrity checks of the 
device, it can be useful to help reduce supply chain risk with minimal cost to a manufacturing 
system.  The IDS technology would reside on the manufacturer’s benchtest apparatus rather than 
as part of the embedded system device (Fig. 4.3), and thus eliminate a significant cost of 
engineering design change-orders for the actual device.  Another major benefit to this modality 
of intrusion detection is that it can be combined with other off-line Trojan detection techniques 
like side-channel noise modeling [33], RF fingerprinting [34][35], and physical unclonable 
functions [36][41] to provide a full suite of risk reducing supply-chain security mitigations. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: IDS system used for verification testing of existing and legacy devices 
One particular challenge to this scenario is that a hardware Trojan trigger event is seldom 
known until after a cyber attack.  So it then becomes critical to tune the sensitivity of this IDS 
system to detect slight changes to the dynamic electrical characteristics of an inter-chip 
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communication bus that might be observed during a passive eavesdropping attack.  The test 
routine must also include electrical test patterns or software induced patterns to catch Trojan 
introduce anomalies to the analog signals of this IDS system. 
Alternately, and the primary intended use, this IDS technology can be included it within 
the device’s design.   This option offers the benefit of intrusion detection during functional 
verification testing as well as on-going intrusion detection after the device has been deployed in 
the field.  By using Bayesian techniques, the intrusion detection model can also be automatically 
tuned to the device’s operating environment or will stay consistent with the degradation from 
device aging, both of which change the electrical characteristics of analog components.  
Although including the IDS technology in the device design has a slightly larger space 
requirement for physical layout, ultimately it helps address upstream supply chain risks and also 
provides a longer term solution to the hardware Trojan problem. 
(a)           (b)  
 
(c)         (d)  
 
Figure 4.4: Several configurations of the IDS system built into embedded system device: 
Using COTS components with built-in ADC (a); using COTS components (b); IDS system 
internal to ASIC (c); dual mode configuration (d) 
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With the built-in IDS technology, there are four primary configurations as shown in Fig. 
4.4.  It is expected that configuration (a) will be the most common choice for device 
manufacturers since it uses COTS components, does not require the expense of designing and 
ASIC, and unused pins of a microprocessor in an existing design might be able to accommodate 
the new I/O requirements.  One anticipated challenge is that the internal ADC hardware must 
meet the sampling rate requirements of the IDS model for a specific communication bus.  If it 
does not, the microprocessor of an existing design must be replaced with a suitable one.  An 
alternate is to use configuration (b) which has an external ADC module, giving the designer the 
flexibility to specify one that meets the IDS system requirements.  A disadvantage of this 
configuration is that an adversary could easily subvert the IDS system by cutting the ADC data 
output lines and injecting false information. 
Perhaps the most secure built-in IDS configuration is that shown in Fig. 4.4 (c).  By 
packaging all IDS components within an application-specific IC, it is not as susceptible to 
subversive physical attacks without destroying the microprocessor.  The downside of using an 
ASIC is increased cost for an end-device manufacturer to create or sub-contract the creation of a 
custom IC.  Additionally, the physical placement of internal resistors and capacitors within the 
ASIC and which are appropriately sized for the IDS model has a large footprint.  For example, 
adding a 100 kΩ resistor within an IC will use approximately 1250 µm2 of space (based on 80 Ω 
resistance per µm2).  The ASIC design is still achievable within some cost-constraints by using a 
multi-project wafer (MPW) fabrication run.  Of course the added security benefit of using an 
ASIC may far outweigh the higher cost when compared to surface-mount COTS components. 
Given that a hardware Trojan might be one of several hardware configurations as discussed 
in Chapter 4, it can be beneficial to have more than one IDS circuit installed in the embedded 
system as shown in Fig. 4.4 (d).  Since each of the hardware threat models has different 
equivalent circuits, the energy transfer characteristics are expected to be different and might 
respond better or worse to a variety of induced challenges.  Consequently, it becomes necessary 
to install several orthogonal IDS circuits to provide more intrusion detection coverage to the 
hardware threat. 
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4.6 Theoretical Basis on Principles of Energy Conservation: KVL and KCL 
The proposed solution relies primarily on the physics principle of conservation of energy 
as described by Kirchhoff’s voltage law (KVL) and Kirchhoff’s current law (KCL) which state 
that the sum of electrical potentials in a closed network is zero (KVL) and that the sum of all 
current flowing into or out of a node is zero (KCL).  In terms of Kirchhoff’s laws, the inter-chip 
communication bus is the closed network, and the point of attachment for a hardware Trojan and 
the IDS circuit is the node described by KCL.  Normally an intruder actively using the bus, i.e. 
“active attack,” will source energy (pull up the voltage potential to VDD) or sink energy (pull 
down the voltage potential close to 0) resulting in a square wave which is then decoded by target 
devices as a binary 1 or 0.  The energy or dynamic power of an intruder hardware based on the 
CMOS inverter is described by Eq. 3.1.  With respect to energy conservation, a significant 
amount of the energy used by a hardware intruder to sink or source activity will be transferred to 
the RC components of the IDS circuit when they are connected to the bus.  The power 
dissipation for a resistor in an RC circuit is described by Eq. 4.1 while that of the capacitor is 
described by Eq. 4.2: 
    (4.1) 
       (4.2) 
It is easily observable that the dynamic power of the intruder, resistors and capacitors are all 
proportional to subsystem capacitance and the square of a voltage with respect to time.  The 
relationship of subsystem energy transfer for two-stage low-pass filters is further described by 
early research on using passive components for signal filtering [42]. 
By using an appropriately sized two-stage resistor-capacitor filter circuit, we are able to 
slow down the voltage response caused by an intruder.  Essentially the capacitor charging current 
is limited by the resistors.  The intruder’s square wave becomes a gradual curve with an 
exponential decay determined by time-constant τ.  This exaggerates any signal perturbations and 
allows several electrical characteristics and intrusion detection metrics to be more easily 
measured. 
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4.7 Voltage Response of Two-Stage RC Circuit 
In order to fully understand how the IDS circuit works, we first look at the physics of a 
basic resistor-capacitor circuit.  The voltage response of a single-stage RC circuit is well 
understood to be proportional to the initial voltage V0 and the exponential of time t over the time 
constant τ (which has dependencies on the resistance and capacitance): 
      (4.3) 
The voltage measurement of the first capacitor C1 then becomes: 
    (4.4) 
where V0  is equal to the initial voltage of the pin at the analog switch.  Since this IDS system 
uses a two-stage RC filter circuit as shown in Fig. 4.1, the initial voltage of the second stage is 
that of the first stage based on principles from KVL and KCL: 
 
 
 
      (4.5) 
Because this particular solution to hardware Trojan detection proposes to use a comparison of 
interval slopes and area under curves between the RC charging cycle and the discharging cycle, 
it is important to have similar rates of decay between each cycle.  In this case we set R1 ≈ R2 and 
C1 ≈ C2, keeping in mind that manufacturing process variations will dictate the actual values of 
each component, and the resulting ideal voltage response for V2 depends on two times t divided 
by the nominal values of R and C: 
      (4.6) 
During the discharge cycle, the voltage response of V1 will follow the same form as Eq. 
4.4, and the voltage response of V2 will be similar to Eq. 4.2 (except with dependencies on R2 
and C2).  If the two resistors and capacitors were not reasonably balanced, then the discharge 
voltage response of V1 becomes similar to Eq. 4.3 and the charge and discharge cycles will be 
too different to apply a linear transformation of the signals to compare the area under curves or 
interval slopes.  In addition, a balanced two-stage RC circuit also works well with different input 
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pulse shapes [37], thus showing its use for the intrusion detection circuit is not limited to specific 
intruder waveforms.  Hence, a balanced RC design seems like the optimal configuration. 
Due to the nature of a two-stage filter circuit, signal perturbations are filtered by the first 
capacitor which dampens the effect prior to the second capacitor.  What this means for intrusion 
detection is that if a signal perturbation is detected while monitoring the second capacitor, the 
cause of the perturbation must have significant energy transfer capabilities such as a hardware 
Trojan attempting to use the communication bus rather than system noise (which is normally 
filtered out).   In other words this IDS circuit helps reduce false positives. 
Within a multistage RC network we begin to notice that there are dependencies of the 
charging and discharging characteristics on the neighboring stages.  In the case of an embedded 
device such as an AMI smart meter, the subsystem under test along with the IDS analog switch 
will have a small signal equivalent circuit with resistive and capacitive elements.  For example 
the analog switch used in this IDS circuit to connect the RC components to the inter-chip 
communication bus has an on-state resistance, charge injection, and a pin capacitance that 
depend on the switch’s connection state [43].  Similarly, each embedded system microprocessor 
or IC connected to the communication bus will also have a resistive and capacitive characteristic 
that affects the IDS initial voltage V0.  In fact the pin capacitance is a known design limitation of 
buses and supporting hardware like that of I2C protocol which is limited to 400 pF (an upper 
bound of approximately 20 ICs).  
4.8 Environment, Aging Degradation, and Effect of Temperature on the IDS Circuit 
One major concern of using passive components for the intrusion detection circuit is the 
environmental effect on the system, especially of temperature.  AMI smart meters and other 
devices will be installed in environments that significantly vary in temperature.  This includes 
locations with extreme heat such as Phoenix, Arizona, or locations with extreme cold such as the 
Province of Ontario, Canada.  Of particular concern is the temperature effect on the dielectric 
characteristics of multilayer ceramic chip capacitors which are used for the IDS circuit.  It is well 
established that inexpensive dielectrics such as Z5U and Z5V are highly susceptible to changes 
in temperature: X7R is moderately affected, and NP0 is not affected [44][45][46].  Some 
hardware designer blogs have jokingly stated that some ceramic chip capacitors could be used as 
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a thermometer.  Consequently, the voltage responses of this IDS system are expected to vary 
with the changes in operating environment. 
Accordingly, hardware-based cybersecurity solutions must accommodate the 
environmental effects on the circuitry.  They must also account for the analog component 
degradation over its lifetime.  The life expectancy in ceramic capacitors is affected by chemical 
changes related to temperature and with some dielectric chemistries the degradation rate doubles 
every 10 degrees C [44].  One approach to handle these transient and cumulative effects is to 
implement an algorithmic compensation on previous voltage response signatures when 
comparing them to the measured voltage responses, much like error correcting code techniques.  
In contrast, a better solution would be to use a Bayesian approach with previous signatures so 
that they evolve with the specific device degradation and its environment.  This results in the 
added benefit of tying a device to its specific environment and therefore increasing the 
unclonable naturally occurring variation to the integrity measurement (i.e. intrusion detection). 
A final side-effect of this IDS circuit is the added capacitance to the communication bus.  
In terms of intrusion prevention (IPS), the IDS circuit capacitance may physically limit an 
intruder’s active use of the communication bus.  As mentioned before, communication protocols 
like I2C protocol are limited to 400 pF, otherwise the square wave edge transitions develop an 
oscillatory ringing that cannot be interpreted by the supporting transistor hardware.  This means 
that if the IDS circuit’s equivalent capacitance were large enough, then attempts by a Trojan to 
use or control other ICs through the communication bus, would be rendered nonfunctional by the 
oscillatory ringing. 
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CHAPTER 5 SMART METER RESEARCH PLATFORM 
 
5.1 General Capabilities 
In order to conduct realistic experiments on hardware intrusion detection, a real 
embedded system device must be used.  Since the availability of AMI smart meters are tightly 
controlled by the manufacturers due to security concerns, an emulated environment had to be 
created for the empirical data collection of this research.  Thus, the creation of the smart meter 
research platform which enables researchers to study embedded system questions within a 
realistic context.  The platform provides the basic functionalities of the smart meter without 
energy usage sampling capability.  This alleviates some of the dangers of working with the high 
energy of a real meter.  The smart meter research platform also provides flexibility to interact 
with the device over USB or over radios of different technologies.   
This system, shown in Fig. 5.1, makes use of four reprogrammable microprocessors 
which allow for software emulation of the basic internal functions of a smart meter: front-end 
microprocessor, metering engine, optical port IC, and data storage IC.  The device also allows 
for custom software to be installed on the microprocessors, which can enable specific research 
experiments.  Additionally there are several connection pins that allow for electrical 
characterization of the inter-chip communication and device power usage. 
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Figure 5.1: Smart meter research platform 
5.2 External Communication Interfaces 
The primary way to remotely interact with the research platform is through a USB 
connection or radio modules which serially transmit and receive data to the software/firmware 
residing on a front-end microprocessor.  The front-end microprocessor transmits data 
simultaneously to the USB connection and the radio module to provide an alternate means of 
monitoring an experiment.  In contrast, the front-end microprocessor can only receive data from 
one source at a time so that collisions are avoided on a shared hardware interface.  The receive 
function (USB or radio) is selected by a mechanical switch. 
The interchangeable radio module is connected with a standard 20-pin connection header 
used by several COTS manufacturers to provide flexibility for different radio technologies (the 
Digi brand is shown in Fig. 5.1).  Examples of the COTS modules include WiFi (IEEE 802.11), 
Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1), ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4), and WiMAX (IEEE 802.16) which are 
available in different transmission powers (i.e. Class 1 or Class 2 radios, etc.) and different 
frequency bands (i.e. 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, etc.).  Some radio modules even offer the ability to 
upload custom software for radio network configurations and routing algorithms.  The digital 
interface of the radio module to the microprocessor allows for various baud rates and protocols 
(e.g. SPI, UART, etc.). 
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For the purpose of quickly configuring a radio network, this invention includes a network 
commission button which is used by some COTS radio module manufacturers to enroll a radio 
module and MAC address into a particular radio network without having to write customer 
software/firmware. 
5.3 Microprocessor Hardware 
All four microprocessors in this system have their own low-power crystal oscillator and 
three indicator LEDs that can be configured through custom software/firmware.  The low-power 
crystal oscillator provides a stable clock source that can be used in conjunction with a 
microprocessor’s internal oscillator.  They are also connected to a master reset button which will 
simultaneously restart the software/firmware executions.  The four microprocessors can 
communicate with each other through an inter-chip communication bus.  The pin connections 
and wire traces support either I2C or SPI protocols depending on the current software/firmware 
configuration and the position of a pullup resistor switch which selects the idle state of the bus 
(i.e. VCC or VSS).  Software/firmware on all microprocessors can easily be customized for 
experimentation. 
The front-end microprocessor emulates that of a smart meter and has the software/digital 
interface for external communication as described by the ANSI C12 standards.  The front-end 
microprocessor also runs the software drivers for both the radio communications module and the 
USB connection.  It also typically serves as the master device on the inter-chip communication 
bus.   The data storage IC is a microprocessor that emulates a smart meter’s non-volatile 
memory.  The software is typically configured to allow for reading and writing of data (which 
might be power usage data or other logged information as mentioned in the ANSI C12.19 
standards).  The infrared optical port IC uses an infrared (IrDA) transceiver connected to the 
protocol supporting hardware of a microprocessor.  The software can emulate the ANSI C12.18 
standards for optical port communication with a smart meter. 
The metering engine IC is a microprocessor that emulates a smart meter’s analog 
sampling of power usage.  Although this microprocessor does not actually sample the power, it 
has the ability to sample low-voltage waveforms through its internal analog-to-digital hardware 
(with the appropriately configured software).  This gives a researcher more realistic data when 
running experiments.  This microprocessor also emulates a smart meter’s remote disconnect 
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function, by acknowledging and serving the disconnect command message that propagates from 
the radio module over the inter-chip communication bus.  The metering engine IC also runs the 
software drivers for the LCD display screen and communicates with it through a serial interface.  
Software/firmware can be easily customized for experimentation. 
5.4 Experiment and Monitoring Interfaces 
The smart meter research platform provides several interfaces to connect external 
measurement or test equipment.  The first interface allows the external equipment to monitor all 
inter-chip communication, including data sent to the LCD display screen, the radio module, and 
the USB connection. 
The research platform also provides a connection header for installing an interchangeable 
module that aids the electrical characterization of the inter-chip communication buses.  This is 
the primary interface used for the IDS circuit described in Chapter 4, which was built onto a 
small circuit board module that can be easily connected or removed during experimentation.  The 
connection header is wired to several jumpers that allow for selection of the communication 
protocol, source clocks, and two I/O ports of the front-end microprocessor.  The module can be 
designed to temporarily shift the electrical characteristics so that the system response can be 
studied.  Fault or error propagation studies might be conducted through this connection header.   
In addition to the interchangeable electrical characterization module, a third connection 
header is provided for system response measurement by external equipment such an 
oscilloscope.  A two-pin jumper on the main power supply is also installed so that in-line power 
analysis can be performed.  This provides another research mechanism to study the electrical 
characteristics of a smart meter or embedded system. 
5.5 Power Supply and Noise Suppression 
The smart meter research platform is powered through the USB connection which is 
controlled through a single power switch with an associated LED indicator.  Since low power 
microprocessors are used, the largest power requirement in the system is that of the radio 
module, in particularly when transmitting data.  The second largest power requirement is that of 
the LCD screen.  To isolate any noise in the system power, low-noise voltage regulators and 
bypass capacitors are utilized for the radio module and separately for the rest of the system 
power.  This provides some flexibility for different COTS radio modules to be utilized, each with 
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a different power requirement, and still to provide the noise isolation while keeping the system 
current draw less than 500 mA supplied by the USB connection. 
 
 
  
39 
CHAPTER 6 DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
 
6.1 Considerations for Sampling Time 
As mentioned in Chapter five, it is important to conduct realistic experiments with real 
devices so that manufacturing process variations (difficult to model and nearly impossible to 
replicate) are captured in the resulting data.  The initial observations to help determine the 
preliminary relationship of possible measurements to that of an intruder were conducted on a 5 
kHz clock speed I2C communication bus.  The slower bus speed allowed for easier configuration 
of test firmware and observations to be more easily distinguished without system noise becoming 
a large factor.  From this the metrics discussed in Table 4.1 were determined as ones with higher 
potential to identify a hardware Trojan on the bus and are easy to measure.  But ultimately the 
experiments needed to be conducted at a more realistic bus speed of 100 kHz, which is 
established as a reliable speed for I2C communication. 
With 100 kHz as the target bus speed, it is important to consider the sampling frequency of 
the IDS system.  Since the I2C protocol is based on eight bits before an acknowledgment is sent, 
the sampling window or charge cycle of the IDS circuit should be long enough to observe at least 
two bits on the bus so that the measurements can be collected in a multifactor sense while 
reducing false negatives.  For this initial research, a window of 40 µs is selected which gives the 
possibility of measuring electrical characteristics of up to four bits at 100 kHz depending on the 
binary-stream on the communication bus.  The front-end microprocessor uses an internal timer to 
trigger and drive and I/O pin for the activation of the sampling widow. 
In addition the Nyquist sampling frequency must account for not only the bit-time, but also 
the other metrics such as interval slopes or any time-offset measurements so that the sampling 
occurs at least twice as fast as the desired time.  Future work will also study the effects of the 
sampling frequencies on the accuracy of the IDS system, primarily because there are engineering 
cost factors involved: faster sampling rates typically increase the cost of the supporting ADC 
hardware. 
6.2 Considerations for Areas Under the Curve 
It is important to size the resistors and capacitors such that the RC time constant for the 
IDS circuit encompasses enough time for a potential intruder to perturb the measured voltage 
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response signals.  Yet the time constant should not be so large that too much energy is stored in 
the capacitor, thus making a perturbation unnoticeable due to the filtering characteristics of the 
IDS circuit.  The other concern is that the time constant should not too small such that any noise 
on the system affects the IDS measurements.  In addition the resistor and capacitor values should 
be varied to understand the effects of them on the IDS sensitivity. 
6.3 Design of Experiment 
This experiment uses randomized design which explored the entire combinatorial space of 
all the hardware.  The smart meter research platform described in Chapter five was used to 
capture the data on the I2C communication bus between the system’s four microprocessors 
(MSP430G2 microcontrollers).  Three different hardware intruders were used as a COTS devices 
attached to the communication bus; they included an AVR328p, PIC24FJ, and another 
MSP430G2 microcontroller.  Each intruder had custom firmware to bypass the I2C hardware 
(which strictly adheres to the protocol) so that an alternating binary pattern could be sent over the 
inter-chip communication bus for identification of an active attack on the system. It is 
questionable if a real intruder will use such a binary pattern, but this does give us more insight on 
whether such and IDS system design will work to identify an intrusion and to distinguish 
between different intruders.  Since each intruder has different clock oscillator hardware, the 
actual bit rate varies slightly between them: AVR328p measured at 99.0 kHz, PIC24FJ at 100.0 
kHz, and MSP430G2 at 99.6 kHz  
Three different voltage response modes for each capacitor value were created by selecting 
different resistor values.  The three modes as shown in Fig. 6.1 (high, medium, low) offer 
different characteristics for the areas under the curve, difference between V1 and V2, peak 
voltages, and capacitor charging rate. 
  
41 
(a)   
(b)   
(c)   
Figure 6.1: Three voltage response modes for each capacitor value 
All RC components were in a 0805 surface mount component package.  The random 
selection of components included those with different nominal tolerances which are determined 
by manufacturing process variation.  For example one capacitor might have a 10% tolerance in 
its capacitance while a resistor might have a 5% tolerance.  Table 6.1 shows the nominal values 
for the resistor-capacitor combinations. Three manufacturers were randomly selected for each 
ceramic chip capacitor value and for each resistor value; in total there were 45 different IDS 
modules.  Detailed information on the random selection and placement of the components is 
located in Appendix C.  
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Table 6.1: Three resistor values for each capacitor value 
Capacitor Nominal Value 
10 pF 20 pF 39 pF 100 pF 200 pF 
84.5 kΩ 64.9 kΩ 49.9 kΩ 21.5 kΩ 12.4 kΩ 
165 kΩ 143 kΩ 97.6 kΩ 49.9 kΩ 24.9 kΩ 
249 kΩ 210 kΩ 165 kΩ 84.5 kΩ 45.3 kΩ 
Resistor Values 
 
Randomization in the experiment was provided by 1) randomly selected manufacturers and 
RC components, 2) randomly selecting the IDS module for each hardware configuration, 3) 
randomly attaching the intruder microprocessor to the three different smart meter platforms, and 
4) randomly selecting the system’s core microprocessors from 45 preprogrammed MSP430G2 
microcontrollers.  During the experiment, the entire combinatorial space of experimental factors 
were explored without allowing repeats: zero to four system microprocessors, one to 45 IDS 
modules, and zero to three COTS intruder microprocessors, for a total of 675 combinations.  The 
three smart meter research platforms were treated as blocking factors and simply rotated through 
the designed experiment to provide an equal amount of use for the other hardware combinations. 
To ensure independence of measurements, the smart meter research platform was powered 
off to change the test configuration, then on before any measurement was taken.  Immediately 
prior to activating the intruder hardware, two sequential measurements were taken of the voltage 
response without an intruder so that a sufficient number of measurements were taken to fully 
characterize the system noise.  A total of 2036 experimental runs were completed, with 686 runs 
for a non-intruder state and 450 runs for each intruder in the random order previously described. 
6.4 Experimental Test Setup 
The smart meter research platform was powered over a USB connection to a computer.  A 
4-channel Hantek DSO3064A oscilloscope was used to capture data from the V1, V2, and COM 
nodes of the IDS circuit and the I/O wire trace that controls the analog switch.  The DSO3064A 
has 8-bit voltage resolution and has a sampling bandwidth of 50 MHz (the Nyquist sampling rate 
is 100 MHz or 10 ns between each sample).  The data is imported from the oscilloscope over its 
USB connection to a computer and then is saved as an ASCII text file with 10,245 samples per 
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channel times four channels.  This resulted in a collection of 83,435,280 data points for the entire 
experiment.  The oscilloscope capture trigger was set to the rising edge of the IDS charge cycle, 
although it captured additional voltage-time data prior to the trigger.  The metrics listed in Table 
4.1 were extracted from the raw voltage-time measurements using custom scripts in the statistical 
software R.  Advanced data analysis was also performed in R. 
The three intruder Trojans were configured with slight differences.  The AVR328p was in 
a DIP package setup on a breadboard with a 3.5 V source.  The PICF24FJ was configured on the 
USB powered Bus Pirate circuit board from Seed Studio, although the firmware was customized 
for the experiment.  The MSP430G2 intruder was configured on one of Texas Instrument’s 
LaunchPad development platforms and supplied power over a USB connection.  Each intruder 
was attached to the SDA and SCL traces of the I2C bus on the smart meter research platform. 
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CHAPTER 7 GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 The Goals of Graphical Analysis 
From graphical analysis we hope to answer the first research question, “Can we identify 
the presence of an intruder?”  The second question is “How?”  While graphical analysis or data 
visualization may not provide exact numerical results, it is highly beneficial to draw inferences 
about the relationships between experimental factors and the measured values.  These graphical 
relationships can also help decide how to perform the numerical analysis and to refine the 
intrusion detection model.  It also provides a mechanism for keen empirical observation, 
especially the real-time data displayed on an oscilloscope.  Ultimately through graphical analysis 
we can visualize the signatures of normal versus anomalous activity.   
7.2 Oscilloscope Trace Observations 
Although it has not been previously discussed how the IDS metrics in Table 4.1 were 
decided upon, observing oscilloscope variations while trying to answer another research question 
led to the discovery of this particular IDS experiment, associated metrics and technical solutions.  
Fig. 7.1 shows one of the original oscilloscope traces using the two-stage RC circuit with analog 
switch.  The green trace is the I/O signal driving the analog switch.  The pink trace is the COM 
node of the analog switch with is immediately before R1 of the IDS circuit.  The yellow and blue 
traces indicate the voltage response of V1 and V2, respectively. 
 
Figure 7.1: Oscilloscope trace of IDS circuit without an intruder 
One observation is that the analog signal for COM is slightly rounded when compared to 
the switch control signal.  This is primarily due to the IDS circuit and analog switch’s resistive-
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capacitive characteristics.  Another observation is that the charge and discharge cycles appear to 
have similar rates of decay and possibly are identical after a linear transformation is performed 
on the signal about the horizontal axis. 
The oscilloscope trace of the IDS circuit with an intruder actively using the 
communication bus (Fig. 7.2) reveals dynamic response characteristics that help define which 
IDS metrics to use.  We first notice that the COM signal is a direct representation of the 
intruder’s activity, which happens to sink or source enough energy to overcome the capacitance 
of the analog switch noted in the non-intruder observation.  In other words, the signal for COM 
is no longer slightly rounded on the rising edge transition.  Other observations of the hardware 
Trojan’s impact on the dynamic response of the RC circuit include decreased peak voltages, 
reduced areas under the curve, and a significant decrease in some of the interval slopes that 
follow a sinking activity.  We also notice that the waveform shapes for V1 and V2 of the charge 
cycle (on the left) are much different than that of the discharge cycle (on the right).  After 
observing several experimental runs, we also can observe that the intruder’s activity is not 
synchronous to the IDS circuit, which indicates that it might be difficult to build an anomalous 
signature based on temporal elements. 
 
Figure 7.2: Oscilloscope trace of IDS circuit with an intruder’s active attack 
7.3 Graphical Analysis of Statistical Data 
One of the most useful statistical plots is that of the probability density function (simply 
known as a density plot).  This plot can overlay a histogram plot and helps identify distribution 
trends in the data.  Based on the high number of experimental runs, not all of the several hundred 
graphics generated from the data can be shown or discussed in a thesis.  For illustration purposes, 
the peak voltages of V1 are selected.  We first look at the density plot for V1 peak voltages in 
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Fig. 7.3 that encompasses all the experimental data and is categorized by the four intruder types 
(one of which is non-intruder).  The density plots reflect Gaussian approximation. 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 7.3: Density plots for V1 peak voltages 
The density signatures between intruders and the non-intruder subsets in Fig. 7.3 seem to 
be somewhat distinct.  Three modes appear in the non-intruder data and are generally shifted to 
the higher peak voltages.  If a threshold-based intrusion detection algorithm were used, it might 
include a narrow band on the peak density values, although this might not work well to analyze 
the first mode (on the left) of the non-intruder data since other intruders also have major density 
components at that voltage level.  The signatures between intruders also appear slightly different 
than each other. 
But if we look at the scatterplot of the same data for V1 peak, a refined inference can be 
drawn.  Fig. 7.4 shows the scatter plot of all the 2,036 experimental runs for V1 peak, and like 
Fig. 7.3 it is also color coded by the intruder subset.  It now appears that the three modes in the 
density plots are masking the 15 resistor-capacitor combinations.  The three observed modes 
represent the distribution of resistor combinations per capacitor value as shown in Fig. 6.1 (high, 
medium, low) and are displayed as the blue horizontally aligned clusters in Fig. 7.4.   
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Figure 7.4: Scatterplot for V1 peak voltages 
The data subset for one particular resistor-capacitor mode reveals more information.  Figure 7.5 
shows isolation of the resistor-capacitor combination where R is nominally 49.9 kΩ and C is 
nominally 100 pF.  The density plots of Fig. 7.6 also reflect this data subset and show that the 
Euclidean distances between each density signature are significant enough to easily identify the 
presence of a hardware intruder with a high probability of success.  To summarize, the graphical 
analysis indicates that numerical analysis should look at the individual resistor-capacitor modes. 
 
Figure 7.5: Scatterplot isolating one mode of V1 peak voltages 
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(a)  (b)  
Figure 7.6: Density plots for V1 peak voltages where R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF 
So now the research question then becomes “can we distinguish between classes of 
intruders?”  A preliminary observation is that the individual resistor-capacitor modes provide 
enough information for metrics like V1 peak voltage to answer this research question because the 
signatures of each intruder type appear unique.  And while the technical details of how to answer 
this question are not as straightforward as using a threshold-based intrusion detection algorithm, 
the solution would provide some variety of cybersecurity attribution data and could possibly be 
extended into more advanced circuit-board-level hardware Trojan detection techniques.    
Other metrics like AreaV1V2_OnOff and SlopeV1qty shown in Fig. 7.7 appear to strongly 
identify the presence of an intruder, but the density signatures of the intruder types appear nearly 
identical and therefore the metric cannot distinguish between types.  Although other data 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 7.7: Density plots for AreaV1V2_OnOff (a) and SlopeV1qty (b) 
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visualization graphics like the scatterplot shown in Fig. 7.8 may indicate randomness if displayed 
in a time series sequence, they do not indicate any useful patterns or relationships.  Ultimately 
from the graphical analysis we start to draw inferences about the relationships between the 
dynamic responses of the IDS circuit and the effects of the intruder types.  These inferences will 
be confirmed through numerical analysis.   
(a)  (b)  
Figure 7.8: Scatterplot of V1pkToIDSoff (a) and boxplot of V1pk (b) 
A more complete set of characteristic graphs and plots for the hardware intrusion 
detection dataset are located in Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER 8 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SYSTEM 
NOISE 
 
8.1 Importance of Noise Characterization 
For threshold-based IDS algorithms, it is critical to understand the noise levels of the 
system.  A threshold-based algorithm will compare a measured value to the expected value in 
order to determine if there is an anomaly or intruder.  The expected values for analog signal 
measurements in no way can be a statically defined value; some variance must be allowed in the 
comparison.  Characterizing the noise will help determine which threshold or statistical variance 
is appropriate to distinguish between an intruder and system noise. 
8.2 Collecting Noise Data 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, there were 686 test runs with no intruder attached to the 
system.  From graphical analysis shown in Chapter 7, we know that it would be inappropriate to 
collect summary statistics for the whole dataset because of the potential masking of modes.  So 
of these runs, the metrics listed in Table 4.1 were tabulated with the statistics of total sum, total 
count, mean, variance, standard deviation, and standard deviation as a percentage of the mean for 
each of the 15 different combinations of resistor-capacitor values.  In order to summarize the 
noise for a particular metric, we use the average variance of fitted values ŷ , where p is the 
number of parameters fitted [47]: 
     (8.1) 
The average variance also happens to be the mean square error (MSE) from the well-defined 
statistical analysis of variance (ANOVA) methodology.  The standard deviations (both forms) of 
each metric were also calculated in a similar fashion.  The summarization of noise for each 
metric is shown in Table 8.1 along with the units of measurement.  It is important to note that all 
statistics and metrics are in terms of fundamental units, with the exception of the standard 
deviation of slopes SDslopeV1_OnOff and SDslopeV2_OnOff.  These measurements were scaled 
to use volts per 10 µs so that the areas could more easily be correlated with the oscilloscope 
display. 
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Table 8.1: System noise summarization 
Metric Var SD 
SD 
Percent 
of Mean 
Units 
V1pk 0.000261383 0.016167359 0.51% volts 
V2pk 0.00027902 0.016703899 0.57% volts 
V1pkToIDSoff 1.15334E-15 3.39609E-08 769.56% seconds 
V2pkToIDSoff 6.38239E-14 2.52634E-07 146.59% seconds 
AreaV1on 9.25758E-13 9.62163E-07 0.99% volt*seconds 
AreaV2on 9.15446E-13 9.5679E-07 1.16% volt*seconds 
AreaV1V2on 4.99075E-14 2.234E-07 1.48% volt*seconds 
AreaV1off 1.6446E-13 4.05537E-07 1.32% volt*seconds 
AreaV2off 1.45365E-13 3.81268E-07 0.79% volt*seconds 
AreaV1V2off 7.26714E-14 2.69576E-07 1.78% volt*seconds 
AreaV1V2_OnOff 1.8434E-13 4.29348E-07 372.60% volt*seconds 
SDslopeV1_OnOff 0.003744857 0.061195238 16.74% volt/10microseconds 
SDslopeV2_OnOff 0.008931744 0.094507905 43.25% volt/10microseconds 
SlopeV1qty 0.034937338 0.186915324 417.87% integer 
SlopeV2qty 0.107346374 0.327637566 279.48% integer 
AreaV1_OnOff 9.89273E-13 9.94622E-07 1.63% volt*seconds 
AreaV2_OnOff 9.53049E-13 9.76242E-07 7.34% volt*seconds 
 
8.3 Analysis of System Noise 
In general, the system noise (i.e. variance) is relatively small with the average standard 
deviation of most metrics equaling less than two percent of the means for each resistor-capacitor 
mode.  Some of the metrics have a large average variance such as the time difference between 
peak voltage and the transition edge from charge cycle to discharge cycle, V1pkToIDSoff.  One 
important observation in the noise characterization is that most of the system noise is orders of 
magnitude less than the expected voltage responses.  For example V1pkToIDSoff shows an 
average standard deviation of 769.56 percent of the means, yet the variance is in terms of 
femtoseconds.  Our expected responses for a 100 kHz bus speed might be in the order of 
nanoseconds; so even with the large variance when compared to arithmetic mean, it is still an 
acceptable measurement for the intrusion detection system. 
The analysis of the noise in metrics SlopeV1qty and SlopeV2qty can also be justified.  Of 
686 test runs, the average variance is one-tenth of an integer or less. Since these metrics count 
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how many times the interval slopes are less than the threshold of zero, a fraction of an integer 
does not really present useful information.  It is probably more important to look at the actual 
count per resistor-capacitor mode to gain a better understanding of the effects of the IDS circuit 
sizing.  Table 8.2 shows the overall results for SlopeV2qty.  It can be observed that the smaller 
capacitance values typically have more interval slopes less than zero, which indicates that the 
lower capacitance has less signal filtering capability and might be more sensitive to perturbations 
caused by an intruder.  
 
Table 8.2: Noise characterization for SlopeV2qty 
Resistor-Capacitor Mode Sum N Mean Var SD 
SD 
Percent 
of Mean 
Cap = 1e-11: Res = 84500 18 45 0.4 0.2454 0.4954 1.238 
Cap = 1e-11: Res = 165000 16 46 0.3478 0.2318 0.4815 1.384 
Cap = 1e-11: Res = 249000 12 45 0.2666 0.2 0.4472 1.677 
Cap = 2e-11: Res = 64900 15 45 0.3333 0.2272 0.4767 1.430 
Cap = 2e-11: Res = 143000 10 45 0.2222 0.1767 0.4204 1.891 
Cap = 2e-11: Res = 210000 4 46 0.0869 0.0811 0.2848 3.276 
Cap = 3.9e-11: Res = 49900 8 47 0.1702 0.1443 0.3798 2.231 
Cap = 3.9e-11: Res = 97600 5 45 0.1111 0.1010 0.3178 2.860 
Cap = 3.9e-11: Res = 165000 3 47 0.0638 0.0610 0.2470 3.871 
Cap = 1e-10: Res = 21500 3 46 0.0652 0.0623 0.2496 3.827 
Cap = 1e-10: Res = 49900 1 45 0.0222 0.0222 0.1490 6.708 
Cap = 1e-10: Res = 84500 0 46 0 0 0 0 
Cap = 2e-10: Res = 12400 0 46 0 0 0 0 
Cap = 2e-10: Res = 24900 2 46 0.0434 0.0425 0.2061 4.742 
Cap = 2e-10: Res = 45300 1 46 0.0217 0.0217 0.1474 6.782 
SUMS 98 686 2.1548 1.6177 4.3033 41.922 
AVE VARIANCE    0.1078 0.3284 2.794 
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CHAPTER 9 IDS MODEL DEVELOPMENT & 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS USING LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION 
 
9.1 The Selection of Analysis Methodology for Intrusion Detection 
There are several ways to approach intrusion detection for an embedded system.  The first 
consideration is the methodology of detection as it will define the numerical analysis algorithms.  
As previously mentioned, NIST has summarized three main classes of intrusion detection: 
signature-based, anomaly-based, and stateful protocol analysis.  For an embedded system, the 
type of threat becomes a major factor in deciding the methodology.  For example a statically 
defined signature-based detection may work reasonably well for known intrusions on the 
network or within a host software process on the common general purpose computer running 
Windows operating system, but may suffer from low accuracy in the AMI domain as not all 
cybersecurity threats are known or cataloged.  Anomaly-based offers more flexibility for the 
embedded system when addressing unknown threats, but sometimes can suffer from 
oversimplified detection models or ones that are too complex for an embedded system. 
Stateful protocol analysis or other state-based analysis techniques such as hidden Markov 
models are very useful if the device under test can be described by discrete states.  The problem 
with state-based analysis in an embedded system is that it cannot capture a side channel attack 
like the eavesdropping passive attack.  It might be possible to describe a side channel attack by 
several discrete characteristics which can then be caste into system states, but this becomes very 
complex.  Similarly, specification-based detection as described in [29–31] also requires the 
system to be described by discrete logical specifications and likely will not detect a side channel 
attack.  Given the challenges of supply chain and unknown or uncharacterized cyber attacks on a 
deployed embedded system, the best option for intrusion detection ultimately is to combine the 
three methodologies into one unified intrusion detection system with its core focused on anomaly 
detection. 
A simple and perhaps naïve technique to apply the previously mentioned methodologies is 
to use a threshold-based algorithm that compares a measured value or multiple values to a 
predetermined threshold or “golden value”.  The threshold for each measured value is usually 
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determined by the system noise ceiling or standard deviation from experimental or randomly 
sampled manufacturing data.  The comparison can be performed by regarding anything greater 
than the threshold as anomalous, using the hamming distance between measured value and 
threshold value, or using the probability of a measurement indicating an intruder (usually a 
probability density function with a Gaussian fit).  To compile the results of multiple 
measurements and give a single IDS indicator, one could simply perform a logical exclusive-OR 
(XOR) on the results of all measurement comparisons.   
While a threshold-based technique as previously described might be simple to implement 
and will not suffer much processor performance loss in a low-power embedded system, it has 
several significant disadvantages.  First, the described technique assumes that the presence of an 
intruder will always be characterized by positive outputs on all IDS measurement comparisons.  
So if one metric fails to detect a deviation from the threshold, then the system may falsely 
indicate the lack of an intruder’s presence.  To reduce this risk, the number of metrics used for 
detection must be a minimal set, but that also consequently means that the IDS system loses the 
ability to fully characterize an intruder with additional metrics.  Another major disadvantage to a 
simple threshold-based technique is that the system noise levels will change with external RF 
interference, temperature or other environmental effects.  In other words, the “golden value” or 
thresholds that were determined during manufacturing test may no longer be valid.  If the 
thresholds are set using a single value from aging or environmental testing, they may have too 
much variance due to the climate conditions between AMI systems and thus allow an intruder to 
hide beneath the margins of the thresholds.  A final disadvantage is that a fixed threshold 
approach has worse prediction performance than other detection methods [48]. 
Although the simple threshold-based IDS algorithm may be improved using Bayesian 
methods to compensate for a system’s operating environment or decay from aging, it may be 
more important to look at the general intrusion detection problem.  Detecting an intruder on a 
cyber-physical system can be classified into two main categories: intruder vs. no-intruder.  Each 
group can be further classified into subcategories based on one or many characteristics.  For 
example an intruder may be one of several types based on the action or trigger event.  Likewise, 
the non-intruder category (i.e. normal) may be categorized by several expected states.  Along 
with each category or subcategory, an intrusion detection system must define the measurements 
and the algorithm to classify or describe each.  And by defining the categories and subcategories, 
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one begins to create an intruder taxonomy described by metrics that are measurable by the 
embedded system. 
By looking at intrusion detection as a problem of categorical data analysis, one can begin 
to see that the detection algorithm can be implemented with a large variety of statistical or 
machine learning techniques which result in a rich characterization of the intruder without the 
insufficiencies of a simple threshold-based detection technique.  Some options include using 
artificial neural networks (ANN), fuzzy model extraction, Kth nearest neighbor (KNN), support 
vector machine (SVM), principal component analysis (PCA), generalized linear models (GLM), 
or logistic regression modeling (LRM).  Each technique has a training phase where experimental 
data with known classes is used to build and optimize the classification model (i.e. intrusion 
detection) followed by a prediction phase.  The prediction classifies sample data with unknown 
classes against a fitted model.  While many of these techniques can have high classification 
accuracy and are lightweight enough for an embedded system, we will primarily use logistic 
regression because of a minimal number of assumptions, no error accumulation term, and 
familiarity of regression modeling. 
9.2 Overview of Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression takes a form similar to other statistical regression methods, where a 
number of covariates and their coefficients determine the expected value or outcome of the 
model.  This includes well recognized types of regression including linear regression modeling 
and generalized linear modeling (shown in Eq. 9.1) where the β terms are the linear coefficients 
and x terms are the covariates.  The final term of the generalized linear model, ε, represents the 
error accumulation. 
  (9.1) 
A logistic regression model (Eq. 9.2) is similar except that there is no error term and the 
coefficients do not represent a linear relationship to a continuous value outcome.   
  (9.2) 
Instead, the discrete outcome is a likelihood or odds ratio of the classification: the probability of 
the outcome being of a certain class divided by the probability of the outcome not being the class 
[49].  Simply stated, the logistic regression model will give a likelihood that the covariate 
measurements indicate a particular class.  The x covariates are thus called predictors. 
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Another difference between logistic regression and the generalized linear model are the 
coefficients.  A basic interpretation of the β coefficients is that the odds of a classification 
increase by eβ for a 1-unit increase in xn [49], [50].  So rather than a linear coefficient, the logit 
coefficient indicates the rate of how much the predictor will affect the outcome with each unit 
step increase.  Eq. 9.3 shows the likelihood ratio relationship between the logit, or log odds, and 
the coefficients where α is the intercept: 
   (9.3) 
In addition, classifier systems that use a multinomial logit model are commonly known as a 
maximum entropy classifier referring to its basis on the log of odds. 
Within logistic regression there are several primary types, although this research will only 
discuss two cases: binomial and multinomial (also called polytomous).  In terms of intrusion 
detection, binomial logistic regression would classify the presence of an intruder vs. no intruder 
– a binary response.  Multinomial logistic regression extends the binomial concepts to a 
classification problem that requires multiple discrete-choice modeling where each outcome class 
can also be represented with a binomial choice.  So if the research goal is to classify multiple 
types of intruders (a discrete set), multinomial logistic regression should be used.  Logistic 
regression can also be combined with Bayesian methods to also account for system changes over 
time from operating environment or component decay, and thus makes it a very powerful 
analysis technique. 
Unlike other statistical methods which require testing assumptions such as normality, 
linearity, or independence of observational errors, multinomial logistic regression has primarily 
one assumption – the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives.  Under this 
assumption Hausman and McFadden state that the assumption facilitates estimation and 
forecasting based on the implication that the model can be estimated from data on binomial 
choices [51].  They also state that a specific multinomial logistic regression model has a 
necessary and sufficient characterization such that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing any 
two alternatives is independent of the attributes or availability of a third alternative.  So if this 
assumption is true then the removal of an irrelevant, third choice, will not affect the estimated 
coefficients on the remaining predictors and they should not be statistically different from the 
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model before the removal of the irrelevant choice.  Hausman and McFadden subsequently 
proposed such a test to verify the assumption for a multinomial logistic regression model. 
To summarize the benefits of using multinomial logistic regression, it has fewer 
assumptions (of normal distribution, etc), it does not accumulate an error or residual over time, 
and there are well established methods to combine it with a Bayesian approach so that its model 
can be effectively refined with subsequent data.  Yet the training dataset for multinomial logistic 
regression must be sizeable, the outcomes must be from a discrete set, and the assumption of 
independence from irrelevant alternatives must be met. 
9.3 Intrusion Detection Model Development and Goodness-of-Fit 
The overall goal in building a regression model is to have a minimal set of predictors but 
still maintain high prediction accuracy. There are several ways to build a regression model and 
eliminate the noncontributing variables such as backward elimination, forward selection, 
stepwise regression, and others.  By eliminating the unnecessary predictors we reduce the noise 
in the estimation.  With each modification of the model, several statistics can be analyzed to 
check the fit of the model and make sure that the change did not have statistical significance.  
Ultimately the optimal intrusion detect model should balance accuracy with computational 
performance. 
The best approach to measure a model’s goodness-of-fit is somewhat contextual; each 
possible goodness-of-fit statistic works differently for various data sets.  For logistic regression 
we have selected two primary statistics: likelihood ratio statistic (a.k.a. LR statistic) and the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  The LR statistic (Eq. 9.4) is a simple comparison of 
logistic regression deviance from one model to the next, where LM represents the likelihood of 
the current model and LS represents the likelihood of the saturated model: 
      (9.4) 
A simple definition of logistic regression deviance is shown in Eq. 9.5 or the discrete 
computational form in Eq. 9.6: 
  (9.5) 
  (9.6) 
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Essentially the LR statistic is computed by performing an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the 
deviances between the two models of comparison.  The second statistic to check goodness-of-fit 
for our intrusion detection model is the Akaike Information Criterion, which was first published 
in 1974 by Hirotugu Akaike as a “versatile procedure for statistical model identification which is 
free from the ambiguities inherent in the application of conventional hypothesis testing 
procedure” [52].  AIC isdefined by Eq. 9.7 where k is the number of independently adjusted 
parameters within the model, and L is the maximum likelihood for the estimated model: 
      (9.7) 
As shown, the AIC is two times the parameters plus the model deviance.  The preferred model 
(i.e. one with a better fit) is the one with a minimum AIC value.  Although there has been some 
debate on the performance of using AIC or LR statistics to check model fit in different 
applications, they are widely accepted as general purpose goodness-of-fit statistics and therefore 
are used in this research.  
Since there is not much prior work characterizing analog signals on an embedded system 
for the purpose of intrusion detection, a relatively good starting approach for this research is to 
use a backward elimination procedure to build and refine the model.  Backward elimination 
begins with a full regression model with all the predictors and then uses stepwise elimination to 
remove predictors that do not significantly affect the model [53].  A saturated model with all the 
predictors and interaction terms can be used as the starting model for backward elimination and 
has the possibility to generate a more accurate model, but due to the combinatorial effects of 
using many predictors it can make the model fit analysis too computationally intensive for an 
embedded system.  In addition near-saturated models can be so specific that they might not 
detect an intruder. 
To check the statistical significance of a predictor and decide which one to remove in the 
next step we will use the p-value from an analysis of variance comparing the modified model to 
that of the full model.  The predictor with the highest p-value will be removed, after which the 
new model will then be refit and analyzed in a similar fashion.  In any of the stepwise model 
building procedures it is important to remove one predictor at a time as the interaction between 
terms is not always clear and so that the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives 
can be checked.  The backward elimination process generally repeats until all predictors have p-
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values that are less than the desired level of significance; this research uses a significance level 
of αcrit < 0.001 or a critical region greater than 99.9% for the predictors.   
In order to analyze the experimental data from this research and build the intrusion 
detection model with backward elimination, a linear transformation is first applied so that the 
large-valued measurements (a multiplier of 103 or kilo) do not mask the small-valued 
measurements (a multiplier of 10-12 or pico).  A full model with all 19 predictors and no 
interaction terms is fitted and analyzed.  Table 9.1 shows the model fit analysis data for one of 
the iterations of backward elimination.  The AIC for this fitted model is 1025.812 while the LR 
statistic comparing the deviances is 0.34837 with a reasonable chi-squared probability of 
95.06%.  As additional predictors are removed, we expect the AIC to increase because the model 
becomes less accurate.  As mentioned before, the ideal and pragmatic intrusion detection model 
will balance goodness-of-fit with the prediction accuracy.  Table 9.1 also shows that the IDS 
metric of SDslopeV1_OnOff should be the next predictor eliminated as its p-value is 0.2010404, 
which is much higher than others and indicates that this predictor does not significantly affect the 
logistic regression model. 
Table 9.1: Analysis of model fit using backward elimination 
 
AIC: 1025.812 
  Resid. df Resid. Dev   Test    Df  LR stat.  Pr(Chi) 
1      6054   917.8122                                 
2      6051   917.4638 1 vs 2     3 0.3483742 0.950688 
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests) 
 
Response: Intruder 
                LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)     
IDSmodule          80.10  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
Cap                 9.88  3  0.0195772 *   
Res               139.90  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pk              578.27  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V2pk              196.09  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pkToIDSoff       25.65  3  1.129e-05 *** 
V2pkToIDSoff        9.37  3  0.0247645 *   
AreaV1on          132.26  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV2on          145.05  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV1off          24.56  3  1.911e-05 *** 
AreaV2off          48.25  3  1.888e-10 *** 
AreaV1V2_OnOff     51.51  3  3.815e-11 *** 
SDslopeV1_OnOff     4.63  3  0.2010404     
SDslopeV2_OnOff    56.38  3  3.490e-12 *** 
SlopeV1qty         29.36  3  1.883e-06 *** 
SlopeV2qty         16.96  3  0.0007219 *** 
AreaV2_OnOff       30.66  3  1.002e-06 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1  
IDS MODEL ADJUSTER - remove next predictor with highest Pr  
[1] "SDslopeV1_OnOff" 
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9.4 Intrusion Detection Model Performance 
As the predictors approach smaller p-values, it may become more important to look at the 
prediction performance rather than the level of significance.  Since good experimental design 
uses random sampling to reduce the residual effects, it would also be appropriate to check the 
prediction performance with similar rigor for a dataset.  In machine learning and categorical data 
analysis it is well accepted to use a process called n-fold cross validation where the dataset is 
divided into n-folds, then n-1 folds are used to train the prediction model and one fold is used for 
the classification.  The fold used for the prediction is incremented along with the folds used for 
training until all folds have been used for a prediction using the fitted (i.e. trained) model.  The 
results are then compiled into an error matrix (also known as a confusion matrix or contingency 
table) such that the true values are cross-tabulated with the predicted classifications.  For the 
hardware intrusion dataset of 2,036 experimental runs, 40-fold cross validation is chosen to test 
the concept of using analog signals for intrusion detection without requiring a high performance 
computer for the analysis.  Table 9.2 shows the error matrix for the fit10 model using Venables 
and Ripley’s cross-validation algorithm from their classification example on forensic glass [54]. 
 
Table 9.2: Error matrix for fit10 
 
 
The numerical data contained within the error matrix provides several useful statistics.  
Among the common ones are accuracy, true positive rate (recall), false positive rate (type I error) 
and precision (positive predictive value).  The overall accuracy is the sum of the error matrix 
times its identity matrix divided by the sum total of the error matrix.  This is simply stated as the 
number of correct predictions divided by the total number of predictions.  So the accuracy of the 
40-fold CROSS VALIDATION 
CONFUSION MATRIX: 
    predicted 
true   1   2   3   4 
   1 686   0   0   0 
   2   0 330  97  23 
   3   0  77 372   1 
   4   0  23   0 427 
SUM TOTAL of MATRIX = 2036 
Class[1:4] = NOINTR AVR328 MSP430 PIC24F 
61 
model fit10 shown in Table 9.2 is calculated by 686+330+372+427
2036
= 0.8915  or 89.15% accurate.  
The other statistical measures are defined in Eq. 9.8 through 9.10: 
    (9.8) 
    (9.9) 
     (9.10) 
While the true positive rate, false positive rate, and precision of an error matrix provide 
useful information, they cannot be used alone to assess the accuracy of a predictive model.  One 
such technique that results in a single statistic is Kappa analysis, which was proposed by Cohen 
in 1960 for use in social sciences but has become a de facto standard among researchers for 
general discrete multivariate classification of remote sensor data [55], [56].  It is easy to make 
the case that the hardware intrusion detection data acquired from analog signals is also a use-case 
of remote sensor data well suited for the Kappa analysis with the goal of distinguishing between 
intruder types.  The resulting Kappa or K̂ statistic provides a single metric that indicates 
prediction performance and can be used to determine if one error matrix is significantly different 
from another; a larger Kappa value is more desirable when comparing two fitted models. 
The primary assumption of the K̂ statistic is the assumption of a multinomial sampling 
model.  Eq. 9.11 shows a basic representation of the maximum likelihood estimate of K̂  and is 
based on the actual agreement between the remotely sensed classification and the reference data 
as indicated by the major diagonal, and the chance agreement indicated by error matrix row and 
column totals [56]: 
  (9.11) 
The computational form of the K̂ statistic used to analyze the hardware intrusion detection data is 
shown in Eq. 9.12 where n is the total number of observations in the error matrix, k is the number 
of rows, 𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the major diagonal (identity), while 𝑛𝑖+ and 𝑛+𝑖  are marginal totals of row i and 
column i respectively [55], [56]:  
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     (9.12) 
By combining backward elimination with 40-fold cross validation and looking at 
goodness-of-fit metrics, true positive rates, false positive rates, precision, and K̂ statistics we can 
select an appropriate IDS model that balances accuracy with computational complexity.  The 
algorithms to analyze the hardware intrusion detection data were implemented in the R statistical 
software (version 2.15) with a summary of the results presented in Table 9.3.  Detailed outputs of 
several model characterizations are located in Appendix B. 
 
Table 9.3: Goodness-of-fit and prediction performance of hardware IDS logit models 
Model Dev G2 df Pr(Chi) AIC Overall Accuracy 
Mean 
TPR 
Mean 
FPR 
Mean 
PPV 
𝑲�  
Statistic 
fitF 4650.7 54 0 1031.46 0.8939 0.8800 0.0441 0.8794 0.8566 
fit1 -5E-04 0 1 1031.46 0.8934 0.8794 0.0443 0.8789 0.8560 
fit2 -0.006 0 1 1031.47 0.8939 0.8800 0.0441 0.8794 0.8566 
fit3 0.3484 3 0.9507 1025.81 0.8939 0.8800 0.0441 0.8796 0.8566 
fit4 2.0493 6 0.9151 1021.51 0.8949 0.8811 0.0437 0.8806 0.8579 
fit5 8.1532 9 0.5188 1021.62 0.8924 0.8783 0.0447 0.8778 0.8546 
fit6 14.623 12 0.2627 1022.09 0.8924 0.8783 0.0447 0.8778 0.8546 
fit7 27.062 15 0.0282 1028.53 0.8939 0.8800 0.0441 0.8790 0.8566 
fit8 34.669 15 0.0027 1036.13 0.8919 0.8778 0.0449 0.8772 0.8540 
fit9 46.847 18 0.0002 1042.31 0.8919 0.8778 0.0449 0.8768 0.8540 
fit10 66.195 21 1E-06 1055.66 0.8915 0.8772 0.0451 0.8769 0.8533 
fit11 89.806 24 2E-09 1073.27 0.8861 0.8711 0.0471 0.8702 0.8460 
fit12 115.04 27 8E-13 1092.51 0.8875 0.8728 0.0465 0.8721 0.8480 
fit13 186.61 30 0 1158.07 0.8767 0.8606 0.0506 0.8601 0.8334 
fit14 262.45 33 0 1227.92 0.8654 0.8478 0.0550 0.8469 0.8181 
 
Model fitF represents the full model with all predictors and no interaction terms, while 
model fit14 contains 14 fewer predictors due to the backward elimination process.  With regard 
to goodness-of-fit, one observation of Table 9.3 is that the deviance G2 and degrees of freedom 
increase as we reduce the number of predictors.  The exception is fitF which is compared to an 
empty model and appropriately has a high deviance.  Another observation is that the p-values 
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listed in column Pr(Chi) indicate that the removal of predictors after fit7 significantly affects the 
deviance and goodness-of-fit.  This relationship is also captured by the AIC value which begins 
to have a larger step-increase after fit7.  To summarize, the goodness-of-fit decreases after fit7 
and the prediction performance metrics subsequently become the model selection criteria. 
The overall accuracy can be used to roughly select the minimal-set model, but it is 
important to use a metric like the K̂ statistic and also the characterizations provided by true 
positive rates, false positive rates, and precision.  A natural boundary exists in the Table 9.3 data 
after fit10 where the overall accuracy decreases by more than 0.5% and the K̂ statistic decreases 
by 0.007 when compared to the full model.  In addition, the mean true positive rates, false 
positive rates, and precision for fit10 are not significantly different from that of the full model.  
Conclusively, fit10 makes a reasonable selection for the IDS model with 89.15% accuracy, a K̂ 
statistic of 0.8533, true positive rate of 87.72%, false positive rate of 4.51%, and precision of 
0.8769.  
The coefficients and predictors of each intruder class for fit10 are shown in Table 9.4.  
Although the intruder class names are shown, they should be interpreted as 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝜋(𝑥)) which is 
described by Eq. 9.3 where x is the intruder class: 
 
Table 9.4: Estimated parameters (coefficients) of logit models for fit10 
Logit Intercept IDS module Res V1pk V2pk V1pkToIDSoff 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑨𝑽𝑹𝟑𝟐𝟖/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) 34.09 -0.128 -13.45 43.38 -82.42 0.97 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑴𝑺𝑷𝟒𝟑𝟎/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) 6.79 -0.031 -5.48 93.15 -87.66 3.14 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑷𝑰𝑪𝟐𝟒𝑭/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) 89.73 -0.442 -28.34 -181.5 102.66 2.13 
 
Logit AreaV1on AreaV2on AreaV2off AreaV1V2 _OnOff 
SDslopeV2 
_OnOff SlopeV1qty 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑨𝑽𝑹𝟑𝟐𝟖/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) -85.7 9.04 -11.98 2.9 27.14 21.79 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑴𝑺𝑷𝟒𝟑𝟎/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) -190.5 142.17 18.21 -16.14 7.01 23.89 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝝅𝑷𝑰𝑪𝟐𝟒𝑭/𝝅𝑵𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑹) 144.34 -265.73 -61.75 34.52 38.27 10.61 
 
9.5 Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves 
Another important technique to analyze a classification model uses receiver operating 
characteristic curves (ROC).  This curve has its origins in radar signal detection during World 
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War II and plots the probability of detecting true signals (true positive rate or sensitivity) versus 
false signals (false positive rate or one minus the specificity).  Although there is some debate in 
statistics research on model performance characteristics that can be derived from a ROC curve, 
the area under the curve (AUC) is universally accepted as a measure of the model’s ability to 
discriminate between outcomes [50].  The AUC ranges from zero to one, with 0.5 representing 
the probability of chance or maximum entropy [57] and is represented by the diagonal where 
sensitivity equals 1-specificity (dashed line in Fig. 9.1).   
 
Figure 9.1: ROC curves for hardware intrusion detection model fit10 
Despite other performance statistics or goodness-of-fit measurements for a model, the 
AUC validates a model against something of reality.  As previously mentioned, the AUC 
measures a model’s ability to discriminate between outcomes - simply stated a relative measure 
compared to the probability of chance.  If the AUC is much greater than 0.5, then the prediction 
performance is much better than chance.  Likewise, if the AUC is less than 0.5, random guessing 
may have better prediction performance than the model.  So if a researcher presents a model that 
has higher prediction performance indicated by a particular statistic and yet the AUC is less than 
0.5, then the model and statistical measurements need to be reconsidered.  Alternately, a poorly 
fitting model may still have good discrimination (i.e. AUC) which further emphasizes the 
importance that model performance should be assessed using both goodness-of-fit and AUC 
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techniques [50].  For the hardware intrusion detection research, Fig. 9.1 shows that the predictive 
model has much higher probability of successful classification than that of chance for each of the 
intruder classes.  In particular, the AUC for the PIC24F intruder is above the 99 percentile while 
that of the MSP430 and AVR328 intruders are 0.9666 and 0.9506 respectively. 
9.6 Sensitivity, Specificity, and Precision Curves 
The overall goal of intrusion detection in this statistical discussion is to predict the intruder 
class based on measured predictors and the fitted IDS model.  This applies to both the binomial 
logit (i.e. presence of an intruder versus no intruder) and multinomial logit (distinguishing 
between several classes of intruders).  In the multinomial case, measured predictors of a fitted 
model will provide a probability of classification for each intruder type with the total sum 
equaling one.  Usually a class with the highest probability becomes the predicted outcome or 
identified intruder, but this is ultimately determined by a probability threshold (normally a 
default of 0.5).   
In order to further discuss probability thresholds for prediction, the relationships observed 
from an error matrix such as Table 9.2 must be correlated to the common terminology of 
sensitivity and specificity.  The true positive rate of a model (Eq. 9.8) is also called the 
sensitivity and is associated to type II errors (β or false negative rate) with the relationship:  
𝜷 = 𝟏 − 𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚.        (9.13) 
The false positive rate (Eq. 9.9) is also known as the type I error (α) and is associated to 
specificity (i.e. true negative rate) with the relationship:  
𝜶 = 𝟏 − 𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚.        (9.14) 
There are several other relationships that can be derived from an error matrix [58], but the 
identification of an optimal probability threshold for model prediction is primarily derived from 
the sensitivity and specificity metrics.  Table 9.5 shows the sensitivity, specificity, and precision 
calculations of the Table 9.2 error matrix for each of the four intruder classes.  From the 
calculations it is clear that the non-intruder class performs at 100% in each metric.  In addition, 
this IDS model distinguishes the PIC24F intruder class much better than distinguishing the 
AVR328 intruder class. 
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Table 9.5: Sensitivity, specificity, and precision calculations for fit10 by intruder class 
 
 
A classification design challenge is that the optimal threshold for an intruder class may not 
be the maximum probability in the predicted set (which includes probabilities for each intruder 
type).  By iterating through different probability thresholds for the sensitivity and specificity of a 
fitted model and plotting the results (Figs. 9.2 through 9.4), an optimal threshold can be observed 
at the intersection of both curves.  This intersection occurs at 0.27, 0.36 and 0.34 for the intruder 
classes AVR328, MSP430 and PIC24F respectively.  Yet if a probability threshold of 0.27 is 
selected for a class and since the total sum of the set equals one, it is possible that the other 
classes might also have probabilities higher than the threshold.  This means that the classification 
may not reach convergence.  Subsequently the optimization of prediction probability thresholds 
requires further research. 
Figures 9.2 through 9.4 also show plots of the precision versus probability thresholds, 
although it is clear that optimizing for precision rather than specificity will have a much reduced 
sensitivity.  Additional ROC, sensitivity, specificity, and precision curves for fitF and fit14 are 
located in Appendix B. 
Class[1:4] = NOINTR AVR328 MSP430 PIC24F 
METRICS: 
  class      sens      spec precision 
1     1 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 
2     2 0.7333333 0.9203822 0.7674419 
3     3 0.8266667 0.9200988 0.7931770 
4     4 0.9488889 0.9792925 0.9467849 
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Figure 9.2: Intruder class AVR328 plot of sensitivity, specificity and precision versus all 
possible probability thresholds for hardware intrusion detection model fit10 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Intruder class MSP430 plot of sensitivity, specificity and precision versus all 
possible probability thresholds for model fit10 
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Figure 9.4: Intruder class PICF24F plot of sensitivity, specificity and precision versus all 
possible probability thresholds for model fit10  
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CHAPTER 10 FUTURE WORK AND TECHNOLOGY 
ROADMAP 
 
10.1 Statistical Optimization of IDS Model and Detection Algorithm 
Aside from the potential optimizations previously discussed on the prediction probability 
thresholds which balance sensitivity and specificity, a fundamental question must be answered: 
how good of performance do we need for the hardware intrusion detection problem?  The 
selected IDS model from backward elimination, fit10, has an overall accuracy of 89.15% which 
is far better than current industry embedded systems which lack a hardware intrusion detection 
solution.  But this accuracy would not suffice in a human authentication application.   
Regardless, the IDS detection model and algorithms are likely to improve by applying 
several additional techniques.  The first expected improvement would come from using a 
Bayesian approach to multinomial logistic regression modeling.  A Bayesian approach accounts 
for previously known information during the training phase, rather than a blind approach to each 
measurement and prediction.  With a Bayesian approach, the accuracy of the predictions or 
intrusion detection should improve with each iteration of model training. 
A second improvement would result from the stratification of training data.  Currently 686 
data entries exist for the non-intruder class state and 450 runs for each intruder.  Stratification 
would normalize the data set such that each class will have an equal number of data entries and 
prevent a bias in training the model.  The IDS detection model is currently biased toward the 
non-intruder class and consequently provides 100% identification on the presence of an intruder, 
but only 89.15% accuracy in distinguishing between intruder classes.  Stratification of the 
training data may slightly reduce performance in classifying the non-intruder, but should 
disproportionately increase the performance of identifying the other intruder classes. 
Additional improvements to this intrusion detection system might be obtained by using a 
third approach that combines several of the previously discussed techniques into a tiered-
classification algorithm.  The first intrusion detection classifier would be optimized to generally 
detect the presence of an intruder at the cost higher false positive rates, but it would be fast and 
less computationally intensive.  Depending on the outcome, a second classifier algorithm which 
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is more costly than the first could be optimized to distinguish between the intruder classes.  In 
this approach the outcome of the first algorithm must be a measure of probability rather than 
discrete classification.  In addition this approach also requires additional research to understand 
the conditions when certain class identification might do better.  Likewise, a third orthogonal 
algorithm could also be applied to refine the classification performance and confidence of 
prediction. 
10.2 Technology Roadmap 
Since this cybersecurity research may be one of the first to address hardware Trojans 
installed within an embedded system (not specific to IC based inclusions), there is much work to 
do before it becomes a mature solution ready for integration into real critical infrastructure 
systems.  The following research questions and concepts still need to be answered:   
• Determine the effects of IDS sampling frequency in order to optimize detection vs. 
hardware resources 
• Solution for passive hardware eavesdropping 
• Solution for multiple authorized master devices on the communication bus 
• Apply these concepts to different types of hardware intruders including voltage follower 
op amp (Fig. 3.5) 
• Securely integrate this IDS technology onto an embedded system during manufacturing 
• Compare the performance of IDS model(s) on embedded microprocessors and hardware 
described in Chapter 4 
• Independent vulnerability analysis of this hardware intrusion detection technology 
10.3 Future Work 
There are several extensions to the work presented in this research which may prove to be 
fruitful and extend the application space of this research’s approach: 
• Distinguishing between individual ICs of the same model and lot 
• Distinguishing counterfeit parts (different RC characteristics) 
• Comparing the performance with other machine learning techniques 
• Study the analog characteristics of circuit components to determine if normal 
manufacturing process variance can create unique hardware signatures that are very-
difficult to replicate.   
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Like many cybersecurity solutions, the technology and approach introduced in this 
research is not a stand-alone solution for all security issues.  But it is a very cost-effective 
solution for a new capability and shows promise not only in its ability to identify the presence of 
a hardware Trojan on an inter-chip communication bus, but also to distinguish between types of 
intruders.  The detection results of this technology can possibly be used for security attribution 
purposes and start to address the complexity of supply-chain hardware security issues.  It can 
also be combined with network centric IDS systems and host-based systems for high-resolution 
and complete security view on critical infrastructure embedded systems. 
To summarize the work of this research, it seeks to help solve the growing cybersecurity 
challenges for critical infrastructure systems.  The first several chapters provide a background on 
the cybersecurity issues with embedded systems.  Chapter 1 introduced the generalized problem, 
Chapter 2 thoroughly discusses the cybersecurity issues of supply chain and a device’s 
engineering lifecycle, and Chapter 3 detailed an embedded system hardware threat model.  And 
while this background information is not all inclusive it does provide more depth and additional 
dimensions to cybersecurity from a system’s engineering perspective; ones that are not addressed 
in traditional security research focused on process or network traffic-based intrusion detection, 
nor are they addressed by typical security penetration testing. 
The subsequent chapters introduce a new approach using resistor-capacitor circuits and 
their dynamic response to characterize a system and any attached hardware intruders.  Chapter 4 
describes the technical details of the IDS hardware, Chapter 5 describes the custom design smart 
meter research platform that enables data collection for this research and future research, and 
Chapter 6 outlines the design of the experiment used to collect empirical data of this IDS 
technology on a real embedded system. 
The final chapters analyze the data so that inferences can be drawn about the usefulness 
and performance of this IDS technology.  Chapter 7 helps quickly identify relationships between 
data and experimental factors that can be further analyzed using numerical analysis and Chapter 
8 characterizes the minimal noise of the IDS system.  Chapter 9 discusses numerical approaches 
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and detection algorithms using statistical and categorical data analysis, builds an IDS model 
using backward elimination while checking the goodness-of-fit and intruder classification 
performance, and also presents the importance of validating a model against the probability of 
chance.  And while there are possibilities for improvement of the IDS model and classification 
performance through Bayesian approach, training data stratification or using tiered-response 
detection algorithms, it still presents a promising approach that begins to address a much larger 
cybersecurity problem for critical infrastructure.  
Ultimately this technology combines the use of an analog signal response from a resistor-
capacitor circuit and machine learning techniques to not only identify the presence of a hardware 
Trojan on an inter-chip communication bus at 100% accuracy for the dataset of over 2000 
measurements, but which also correctly distinguishes between several types of implanted Trojans 
at 89% accuracy.  While this research has focused on the security of inter-chip communication, it 
demonstrates the possibility of using low-power analog signals for device-level information 
assurance.  And despite an extensive list of issues to solve before integrating into real systems, 
supply chain intricacies, and low-power embedded system design constraints, the new 
perspectives presented in this research have many implications for the growing complexities of 
securing cyber-physical systems. 
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APPENDIX A. Characteristic Graphs and Figures of Data 
A.1 Scatterplots – Complete Dataset 
 
Figure A.1: Scatterplot of V1pk (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.2: Scatterplot of V2pk (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.3: Scatterplot of V1pkToIDSoff (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.4: Scatterplot of V2pkToIDSoff (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.5: Scatterplot of AreaV1V2on (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.6: Scatterplot of AreaV1V2off (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.7: Scatterplot of AreaV1V2_OnOff (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.8: Scatterplot of SDslopeV1_OnOff (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.9: Scatterplot of SDslopeV2_OnOff (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.10: Scatterplot of SlopeV1qty (complete dataset) 
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Figure A.11: Scatterplot of SlopeV2qty (complete dataset) 
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A.2 Density Plots of Complete Dataset 
 
Figure A.12: Density plot of V1pk (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.13: Density plot of V2pk (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.14: Density plot of V1pkToIDSoff (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.15: Density plot of V2pkToIDSoff (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.16: Density plot of AreaV1V2on (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.17: Density plot of AreaV1V2off (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.18: Density plot of AreaV1V2_OnOff (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.19: Density plot of SDslopeV1_OnOff (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.20: Density plot of SDslopeV2_OnOff (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.21: Density plot of SlopeV1qty (complete dataset)  
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Figure A.22: Density plot of SlopeV2qty (complete dataset)  
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A.3 Density Plots – R≈49.9 KΩ and C≈100 pF 
 
Figure A.23: Density plot of V1pk, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.24: Density plot of V2pk, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.25: Density plot of V1pkToIDSoff, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.26: Density plot of V2pkToIDSoff, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.27: Density plot of AreaV1V2on, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.28: Density plot of AreaV1V2off, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.29: Density plot of AreaV1V2_OnOff, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.30: Density plot of SDslopeV1_OnOff, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.31: Density plot of SDslopeV2_OnOff, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.32: Density plot of SlopeV1qty, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF   
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Figure A.33: Density plot of SlopeV2qty, R ≈ 49.9 kΩ and C ≈ 100 pF 
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APPENDIX B. Logistic Regression Model Analysis Data 
B.1 Output of Model Fitting: fitF (full model) 
 
## NOTE: Logistic Regression Model Fit Procedures: 
 # Use the Pr(>Chisq) statistic as the primary decider for the model - record G^2, 
AIC, df, Prediction Error (miss rate) 
 # Start with full model using (Y ~ .) operator and all predictor columns.  Remove 
the cols of unused predictors: 
# Then iterate until all predictors Xn are significant at desired alpha level 
(default is 0.05) 
 
**************** NEW MODEL ***************** 
# weights:  88 (63 variable) 
initial  value 2822.495319  
iter  10 value 1482.482864 
iter  20 value 893.597388 
iter  30 value 617.695503 
iter  40 value 524.688433 
iter  50 value 495.273563 
iter  60 value 476.281060 
iter  70 value 467.766178 
iter  80 value 463.867074 
iter  90 value 461.544223 
iter 100 value 460.753938 
iter 110 value 460.426767 
iter 120 value 459.835746 
iter 130 value 459.356880 
iter 140 value 459.304163 
iter 150 value 459.231504 
iter 160 value 459.151393 
iter 170 value 459.008089 
iter 180 value 458.959203 
iter 190 value 458.902422 
iter 200 value 458.838094 
iter 210 value 458.753646 
iter 220 value 458.747932 
iter 230 value 458.733804 
iter 240 value 458.733144 
iter 250 value 458.731892 
iter 250 value 458.731891 
iter 250 value 458.731891 
final  value 458.731891  
converged 
Call: 
multinom(formula = Intruder ~ ., data = multidata, maxit = 1000) 
 
Coefficients: 
  (Intercept)  IDSmodule        Cap        Res       V1pk      V2pk 
2   17.228683  0.2455088 -1.4102064  -6.204550   52.93219 -84.47125 
3   -8.664804  0.3723091 -2.8621933   3.355777  108.74229 -97.09592 
4   56.906778 -0.1046092 -0.1707526 -18.192985 -202.04147 128.07029 
  V1pkToIDSoff V2pkToIDSoff   AreaV1on   AreaV2on AreaV1V2on AreaV1off 
2    -2.082298    0.2256163  -21.50961  -12.28094 -4.3364467  13.14286 
3     1.714197   -2.1324478 -127.64431  159.93367 -5.6640626 -78.33229 
4    -1.156317   -1.7206410   74.44861 -220.28919  0.2205705  28.88744 
  AreaV2off AreaV1V2off AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV1_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff 
2 -46.49984   0.7668306       4.033838        26.21070        7.806660 
3  78.52817  -0.8420152      -6.585581        24.29444       -9.620816 
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4 -62.15008 -14.7087251      37.711567        21.81076       21.054773 
  SlopeV1qty SlopeV2qty AreaV1_OnOff AreaV2_OnOff 
2   26.41804   16.34087    -23.59511     -4.18498 
3   27.03313   16.38136    -85.96294     11.90354 
4   11.27217   23.58262     71.41970    -37.70302 
 
Std. Errors: 
  (Intercept) IDSmodule       Cap       Res     V1pk     V2pk V1pkToIDSoff 
2    1.948528  8.492471 0.5605115 0.7492481 3.692008 4.088029    0.5040206 
3    2.384443  8.492446 0.6831421 0.9146324 3.731552 4.390233    0.6736369 
4    3.165210  8.492578 0.9951042 1.3279323 2.854521 3.423957    0.8508637 
  V2pkToIDSoff AreaV1on AreaV2on AreaV1V2on AreaV1off AreaV2off AreaV1V2off 
2    0.6239874 2.931345 6.649695   1.557534  1.691072  3.874027    2.353587 
3    0.8473658 2.829076 6.318849   1.838505  2.068840  3.555370    2.584504 
4    1.0684997 2.552702 2.556552   2.626746  2.876093  1.332372    3.264209 
  AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV1_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff SlopeV1qty SlopeV2qty 
2       1.539388        1.497276        1.829499   1.110018  0.7826893 
3       1.852843        1.993922        2.356258   1.354728  0.9808477 
4       2.382634        2.622209        3.214743   2.019868  1.4016136 
  AreaV1_OnOff AreaV2_OnOff 
2     2.866894     2.965550 
3     2.816503     3.814772 
4     2.125523     4.226577 
 
Value/SE (Wald statistics): 
  (Intercept)   IDSmodule        Cap        Res      V1pk      V2pk 
2    8.841897  0.02890899 -2.5159276  -8.281035  14.33696 -20.66307 
3   -3.633891  0.04384003 -4.1897482   3.668990  29.14130 -22.11635 
4   17.978831 -0.01231772 -0.1715927 -13.700236 -70.77947  37.40417 
  V1pkToIDSoff V2pkToIDSoff   AreaV1on   AreaV2on  AreaV1V2on  AreaV1off 
2    -4.131375    0.3615718  -7.337798  -1.846842 -2.78417379   7.771906 
3     2.544690   -2.5165609 -45.118725  25.310572 -3.08079755 -37.862908 
4    -1.358992   -1.6103336  29.164632 -86.166530  0.08397098  10.043985 
  AreaV2off AreaV1V2off AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV1_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff 
2 -12.00297   0.3258135       2.620417       17.505589        4.267103 
3  22.08720  -0.3257937      -3.554312       12.184246       -4.083092 
4 -46.64618  -4.5060608      15.827677        8.317704        6.549441 
  SlopeV1qty SlopeV2qty AreaV1_OnOff AreaV2_OnOff 
2  23.799648   20.87785    -8.230198    -1.411198 
3  19.954653   16.70123   -30.521161     3.120380 
4   5.580648   16.82533    33.601003    -8.920464 
 
Residual Deviance: 917.4638  
AIC: 1031.464  
 
### Confidence Intervals ### 
, , 2 
                      2.5 %      97.5 % 
(Intercept)      13.4096384  21.0477274 
IDSmodule       -16.3994293  16.8904468 
Cap              -2.5087888  -0.3116240 
Res              -7.6730492  -4.7360507 
V1pk             45.6959831  60.1683900 
V2pk            -92.4836388 -76.4588591 
V1pkToIDSoff     -3.0701603  -1.0944360 
V2pkToIDSoff     -0.9973765   1.4486090 
AreaV1on        -27.2549442 -15.7642841 
AreaV2on        -25.3141001   0.7522265 
AreaV1V2on       -7.3891581  -1.2837352 
AreaV1off         9.8284144  16.4572957 
AreaV2off       -54.0927962 -38.9068880 
AreaV1V2off      -3.8461159   5.3797771 
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AreaV1V2_OnOff    1.0166931   7.0509830 
SDslopeV1_OnOff  23.2760921  29.1453062 
SDslopeV2_OnOff   4.2209085  11.3924112 
SlopeV1qty       24.2424480  28.5936397 
SlopeV2qty       14.8068286  17.8749144 
AreaV1_OnOff    -29.2141184 -17.9760988 
AreaV2_OnOff     -9.9973519   1.6273920 
 
, , 3 
                       2.5 %       97.5 % 
(Intercept)      -13.3382258   -3.9913826 
IDSmodule        -16.2725789   17.0171971 
Cap               -4.2011271   -1.5232594 
Res                1.5631307    5.1484237 
V1pk             101.4285779  116.0559925 
V2pk            -105.7006196  -88.4912206 
V1pkToIDSoff       0.3938928    3.0345009 
V2pkToIDSoff      -3.7932543   -0.4716413 
AreaV1on        -133.1892023 -122.0994269 
AreaV2on         147.5489555  172.3183869 
AreaV1V2on        -9.2674667   -2.0606584 
AreaV1off        -82.3871413  -74.2774384 
AreaV2off         71.5597776   85.4965722 
AreaV1V2off       -5.9075501    4.2235196 
AreaV1V2_OnOff   -10.2170866   -2.9540758 
SDslopeV1_OnOff   20.3864221   28.2024529 
SDslopeV2_OnOff  -14.2389967   -5.0026362 
SlopeV1qty        24.3779150   29.6883524 
SlopeV2qty        14.4589321   18.3037845 
AreaV1_OnOff     -91.4831842  -80.4426955 
AreaV2_OnOff       4.4267227   19.3803560 
 
, , 4 
                      2.5 %       97.5 % 
(Intercept)       50.703080   63.1104755 
IDSmodule        -16.749756   16.5405377 
Cap               -2.121121    1.7796157 
Res              -20.795684  -15.5902857 
V1pk            -207.636232 -196.4467157 
V2pk             121.359458  134.7811239 
V1pkToIDSoff      -2.823979    0.5113456 
V2pkToIDSoff      -3.814862    0.3735799 
AreaV1on          69.445404   79.4518111 
AreaV2on        -225.299937 -215.2784385 
AreaV1V2on        -4.927758    5.3688986 
AreaV1off         23.250401   34.5244804 
AreaV2off        -64.761483  -59.5386793 
AreaV1V2off      -21.106457   -8.3109927 
AreaV1V2_OnOff    33.041690   42.3814449 
SDslopeV1_OnOff   16.671321   26.9501896 
SDslopeV2_OnOff   14.753992   27.3555547 
SlopeV1qty         7.313303   15.2310409 
SlopeV2qty        20.835504   26.3297284 
AreaV1_OnOff      67.253751   75.5856471 
AreaV2_OnOff     -45.986962  -29.4190869 
 
************************* 
40-fold CROSS VALIDATION 
CONFUSION MATRIX: 
    predicted 
true   1   2   3   4 
   1 686   0   0   0 
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   2   0 331  97  22 
   3   0  77 372   1 
   4   0  19   0 431 
SUM TOTAL of MATRIX = 2036 
METRICS: 
  class      sens      spec precision 
1     1 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 
2     2 0.7355556 0.9235060 0.7751756 
3     3 0.8266667 0.9200988 0.7931770 
4     4 0.9577778 0.9800866 0.9493392 
Class[1:4] = NOINTR AVR328 MSP430 PIC24F 
 
Overall Error Rate =  10.60904 % 
Overall Accuracy =  89.39096 % 
Mean Sensitivity (TPR) =  88 % 
Mean False Positive Rate (1-SPC) =  4.407715 % 
Mean Precision (PPV) =  87.9423 % 
Khat Statistic =  0.8566197  
 
*** anova(fit0, fitF, test=Chisq) ***  
Likelihood ratio tests of Multinomial Models 
 
Response: Intruder 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Model 
1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1 
2 IDSmodule + Cap + Res + V1pk + V2pk + V1pkToIDSoff + V2pkToIDSoff + AreaV1on + 
AreaV2on + AreaV1V2on + AreaV1off + AreaV2off + AreaV1V2off + AreaV1V2_OnOff + 
SDslopeV1_OnOff + SDslopeV2_OnOff + SlopeV1qty + SlopeV2qty + AreaV1_OnOff + 
AreaV2_OnOff 
  Resid. df Resid. Dev   Test    Df LR stat. Pr(Chi) 
1      6105  5568.1864                               
2      6051   917.4638 1 vs 2    54 4650.723       0 
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests) 
 
Response: Intruder 
                LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)     
IDSmodule          83.43  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
Cap                 9.51  3  0.0231793 *   
Res               138.70  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pk              558.80  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V2pk              192.86  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pkToIDSoff       28.21  3  3.287e-06 *** 
V2pkToIDSoff       11.58  3  0.0089829 **  
AreaV1on            6.67  3  0.0832205 .   
AreaV2on          137.87  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV1V2on          4.62  3  0.2017310     
AreaV1off           6.69  3  0.0826288 .   
AreaV2off          16.06  3  0.0011023 **  
AreaV1V2off         3.54  3  0.3159060     
AreaV1V2_OnOff      4.10  3  0.2505444     
SDslopeV1_OnOff     6.08  3  0.1079836     
SDslopeV2_OnOff    61.24  3  3.193e-13 *** 
SlopeV1qty         34.67  3  1.432e-07 *** 
SlopeV2qty         18.32  3  0.0003778 *** 
AreaV1_OnOff        6.32  3  0.0969307 .   
AreaV2_OnOff       24.28  3  2.188e-05 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1  
IDS MODEL ADJUSTER - remove next predictor with highest Pr  
[1] "AreaV1V2off" 
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B.2 Output of Model Fitting: fit10 (selected IDS model) 
 
## NOTE: Logistic Regression Model Fit Procedures: 
 # Use the Pr(>Chisq) statistic as the primary decider for the model - record G^2, 
AIC, df, Prediction Error (miss rate) 
 # Start with full model using (Y ~ .) operator and all predictor columns.  Remove 
the cols of unused predictors: 
 # Then iterate until all predictors Xn are significant at desired alpha level 
(default is 0.05) 
 
**************** NEW MODEL ***************** 
# weights:  52 (36 variable) 
initial  value 2822.495319  
iter  10 value 1576.496251 
iter  20 value 904.969947 
iter  30 value 642.723847 
iter  40 value 557.285559 
iter  50 value 514.797448 
iter  60 value 497.292086 
iter  70 value 494.270138 
iter  80 value 493.027082 
iter  90 value 492.461812 
iter 100 value 492.313782 
iter 110 value 492.151061 
iter 120 value 492.049538 
iter 130 value 491.910724 
iter 140 value 491.842153 
final  value 491.829383  
converged 
Call: 
multinom(formula = Intruder ~ ., data = multidata[, -c(14, 20,  
    11, 16, 8, 3, 12, 19, 21)], maxit = 1000) 
 
Coefficients: 
  (Intercept)   IDSmodule       Res       V1pk      V2pk V1pkToIDSoff 
2   34.087537 -0.12732062 -13.44443   43.37896 -82.41595    0.9600343 
3    6.783198 -0.03015854  -5.47104   93.14823 -87.65957    3.1304438 
4   89.728319 -0.44152667 -28.33285 -181.48034 102.65795    2.1235833 
    AreaV1on    AreaV2on AreaV2off AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff SlopeV1qty 
2  -85.69365    9.039451 -11.97166       2.893178        27.13420   21.78123 
3 -190.57411  142.160762  18.20492     -16.135828         7.00139   23.88304 
4  144.33058 -265.725035 -61.74259      34.519887        38.26685   10.60183 
 
Std. Errors: 
  (Intercept) IDSmodule       Res     V1pk     V2pk V1pkToIDSoff AreaV1on 
2    1.968941  3.804507 0.6904555 4.790336 5.481514    0.3370906 5.449905 
3    2.465970  3.804510 0.8514835 5.104165 6.346641    0.4231639 5.863612 
4    3.269702  3.804587 1.2187797 7.572810 9.431636    0.5950709 5.200744 
  AreaV2on AreaV2off AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff SlopeV1qty 
2 5.892581  2.457128       1.750669        1.607131   0.944608 
3 6.137080  3.121915       2.164410        2.087313   1.192280 
4 4.695777  4.114437       2.957325        2.785322   1.659504 
 
Value/SE (Wald statistics): 
  (Intercept)   IDSmodule        Res       V1pk      V2pk V1pkToIDSoff 
2   17.312626 -0.03346573 -19.471820   9.055515 -15.03525     2.848001 
3    2.750722 -0.00792705  -6.425304  18.249456 -13.81196     7.397710 
4   27.442356 -0.11605114 -23.246902 -23.964728  10.88443     3.568622 
   AreaV1on   AreaV2on  AreaV2off AreaV1V2_OnOff SDslopeV2_OnOff SlopeV1qty 
2 -15.72388   1.534039  -4.872218       1.652613        16.88363  23.058491 
3 -32.50115  23.164234   5.831331      -7.455069         3.35426  20.031409 
4  27.75191 -56.588089 -15.006326      11.672672        13.73875   6.388553 
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Residual Deviance: 983.6588  
AIC: 1055.659  
 
### Confidence Intervals ### 
, , 2 
                      2.5 %     97.5 % 
(Intercept)      30.2284835  37.946590 
IDSmodule        -7.5840182   7.329377 
Res             -14.7976940 -12.091158 
V1pk             33.9900716  52.767843 
V2pk            -93.1595242 -71.672386 
V1pkToIDSoff      0.2993489   1.620720 
AreaV1on        -96.3752629 -75.012027 
AreaV2on         -2.5097962  20.588698 
AreaV2off       -16.7875436  -7.155780 
AreaV1V2_OnOff   -0.5380699   6.324427 
SDslopeV2_OnOff  23.9842862  30.284123 
SlopeV1qty       19.9298369  23.632632 
 
, , 3 
                      2.5 %      97.5 % 
(Intercept)        1.949985   11.616412 
IDSmodule         -7.486862    7.426545 
Res               -7.139917   -3.802163 
V1pk              83.144255  103.152214 
V2pk            -100.098755  -75.220377 
V1pkToIDSoff       2.301058    3.959830 
AreaV1on        -202.066578 -179.081642 
AreaV2on         130.132306  154.189218 
AreaV2off         12.086079   24.323761 
AreaV1V2_OnOff   -20.377994  -11.893662 
SDslopeV2_OnOff    2.910332   11.092448 
SlopeV1qty        21.546217   26.219868 
 
, , 4 
                       2.5 %      97.5 % 
(Intercept)       83.3198212   96.136817 
IDSmodule         -7.8983801    7.015327 
Res              -30.7216162  -25.944088 
V1pk            -196.3227728 -166.637902 
V2pk              84.1722782  121.143612 
V1pkToIDSoff       0.9572658    3.289901 
AreaV1on         134.1373107  154.523851 
AreaV2on        -274.9285885 -256.521482 
AreaV2off        -69.8067348  -53.678438 
AreaV1V2_OnOff    28.7236360   40.316138 
SDslopeV2_OnOff   32.8077229   43.725985 
SlopeV1qty         7.3492600   13.854395 
 
************************* 
40-fold CROSS VALIDATION 
CONFUSION MATRIX: 
    predicted 
true   1   2   3   4 
   1 686   0   0   0 
   2   0 330  97  23 
   3   0  77 372   1 
   4   0  23   0 427 
SUM TOTAL of MATRIX = 2036 
METRICS: 
  class      sens      spec precision 
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1     1 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 
2     2 0.7333333 0.9203822 0.7674419 
3     3 0.8266667 0.9200988 0.7931770 
4     4 0.9488889 0.9792925 0.9467849 
Class[1:4] = NOINTR AVR328 MSP430 PIC24F 
 
Overall Error Rate =  10.85462 % 
Overall Accuracy =  89.14538 % 
Mean Sensitivity (TPR) =  87.72222 % 
Mean False Positive Rate (1-SPC) =  4.505662 % 
Mean Precision (PPV) =  87.68509 % 
Khat Statistic =  0.8533007  
 
****** anova(fit0, fit10, test=Chisq) ******  
Likelihood ratio tests of Multinomial Models 
 
Response: Intruder 
                                                                                                                           
Model 
1                                                                                                                              
1 
2 IDSmodule + Res + V1pk + V2pk + V1pkToIDSoff + AreaV1on + AreaV2on + AreaV2off + 
AreaV1V2_OnOff + SDslopeV2_OnOff + SlopeV1qty 
  Resid. df Resid. Dev   Test    Df LR stat. Pr(Chi) 
1      6105  5568.1864                               
2      6072   983.6588 1 vs 2    33 4584.528       0 
 
****** anova(fitF, fit10, test=Chisq) ******  
Likelihood ratio tests of Multinomial Models 
 
Response: Intruder 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Model 
1                                                                                                                          
IDSmodule + Res + V1pk + V2pk + V1pkToIDSoff + AreaV1on + AreaV2on + AreaV2off + 
AreaV1V2_OnOff + SDslopeV2_OnOff + SlopeV1qty 
2 IDSmodule + Cap + Res + V1pk + V2pk + V1pkToIDSoff + V2pkToIDSoff + AreaV1on + 
AreaV2on + AreaV1V2on + AreaV1off + AreaV2off + AreaV1V2off + AreaV1V2_OnOff + 
SDslopeV1_OnOff + SDslopeV2_OnOff + SlopeV1qty + SlopeV2qty + AreaV1_OnOff + 
AreaV2_OnOff 
  Resid. df Resid. Dev   Test    Df LR stat.      Pr(Chi) 
1      6072   983.6588                                    
2      6051   917.4638 1 vs 2    21 66.19498 1.412423e-06 
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests) 
 
Response: Intruder 
                LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)     
IDSmodule         163.51  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
Res               170.02  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pk              590.80  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V2pk              183.71  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pkToIDSoff       24.11  3  2.368e-05 *** 
AreaV1on          288.87  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV2on          410.74  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV2off         160.33  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV1V2_OnOff    106.18  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
SDslopeV2_OnOff    87.69  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
SlopeV1qty         24.75  3  1.746e-05 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1  
IDS MODEL ADJUSTER - remove next predictor with highest Pr  
[1] "V1pkToIDSoff" 
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B.3 Output of Model Fitting: fit14 (lower performance) 
 
## NOTE: Logistic Regression Model Fit Procedures: 
 # Use the Pr(>Chisq) statistic as the primary decider for the model - record G^2, 
AIC, df, Prediction Error (miss rate) 
 # Start with full model using (Y ~ .) operator and all predictor columns.  Remove 
the cols of unused predictors: 
 # Then iterate until all predictors Xn are significant at desired alpha level 
(default is 0.05) 
 
**************** NEW MODEL ***************** 
# weights:  36 (24 variable) 
initial  value 2822.495319  
iter  10 value 1566.930487 
iter  20 value 769.792031 
iter  30 value 651.190219 
iter  40 value 599.665521 
iter  50 value 593.281778 
iter  60 value 591.292119 
iter  70 value 590.371570 
iter  80 value 590.083992 
iter  90 value 589.998414 
final  value 589.957975  
converged 
Call: 
multinom(formula = Intruder ~ ., data = multidata[, -c(14, 20,  
    11, 16, 8, 3, 12, 19, 21, 7, 18, 17, 15)], maxit = 1000) 
 
Coefficients: 
  (Intercept)    IDSmodule        Res       V1pk      V2pk   AreaV1on 
2    50.35327 -0.064367497 -13.253101   51.24005 -51.97816  -63.46759 
3    18.36721 -0.003318551  -7.414385   89.77363 -85.59076 -128.05640 
4   103.10139 -0.329255481 -26.616632 -121.86835 106.10120   58.87664 
    AreaV2on  AreaV2off 
2  -15.79917 -36.315179 
3   81.66899   4.573242 
4 -167.79143 -87.411641 
 
Std. Errors: 
  (Intercept) IDSmodule       Res     V1pk     V2pk AreaV1on AreaV2on AreaV2off 
2    1.244644 0.5783854 0.5939403 3.505296 3.298434 3.757072 4.281145  1.622692 
3    1.521330 0.5783274 0.7067899 3.520704 3.320817 3.908536 4.578383  1.963548 
4    1.651375 0.5787623 1.0070353 5.043488 4.704208 3.926632 3.885620  2.103449 
 
Value/SE (Wald statistics): 
  (Intercept)    IDSmodule       Res      V1pk      V2pk  AreaV1on   AreaV2on 
2    40.45596 -0.111288253 -22.31386  14.61790 -15.75844 -16.89283  -3.690407 
3    12.07312 -0.005738188 -10.49022  25.49877 -25.77401 -32.76326  17.837954 
4    62.43365 -0.568895884 -26.43069 -24.16351  22.55453  14.99418 -43.182665 
  AreaV2off 
2 -22.37958 
3   2.32907 
4 -41.55634 
 
Residual Deviance: 1179.916  
AIC: 1227.916  
 
### Confidence Intervals ### 
, , 2 
                 2.5 %     97.5 % 
(Intercept)  47.913813  52.792728 
IDSmodule    -1.197982   1.069247 
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Res         -14.417203 -12.089000 
V1pk         44.369797  58.110303 
V2pk        -58.442969 -45.513346 
AreaV1on    -70.831311 -56.103860 
AreaV2on    -24.190058  -7.408279 
AreaV2off   -39.495598 -33.134760 
 
, , 3 
                   2.5 %      97.5 % 
(Intercept)   15.3854585   21.348964 
IDSmodule     -1.1368194    1.130182 
Res           -8.7996678   -6.029102 
V1pk          82.8731799   96.674086 
V2pk         -92.0994377  -79.082076 
AreaV1on    -135.7169850 -120.395805 
AreaV2on      72.6955247   90.642458 
AreaV2off      0.7247584    8.421726 
 
, , 4 
                  2.5 %       97.5 % 
(Intercept)   99.864755  106.3380275 
IDSmodule     -1.463609    0.8050978 
Res          -28.590385  -24.6428792 
V1pk        -131.753399 -111.9832907 
V2pk          96.881125  115.3212813 
AreaV1on      51.180586   66.5727011 
AreaV2on    -175.407104 -160.1757536 
AreaV2off    -91.534325  -83.2889572 
 
************************* 
40-fold CROSS VALIDATION 
CONFUSION MATRIX: 
    predicted 
true   1   2   3   4 
   1 686   0   0   0 
   2   0 300 120  30 
   3   0  93 355   2 
   4   0  29   0 421 
SUM TOTAL of MATRIX = 2036 
METRICS: 
  class      sens      spec precision 
1     1 1.0000000 1.0000000 1.0000000 
2     2 0.6666667 0.9051322 0.7109005 
3     3 0.7888889 0.9025183 0.7473684 
4     4 0.9355556 0.9725322 0.9293598 
Class[1:4] = NOINTR AVR328 MSP430 PIC24F 
 
Overall Error Rate =  13.45776 % 
Overall Accuracy =  86.54224 % 
Mean Sensitivity (TPR) =  84.77778 % 
Mean False Positive Rate (1-SPC) =  5.495434 % 
Mean Precision (PPV) =  84.69072 % 
Khat Statistic =  0.8181195  
 
****** anova(fit0, fit14, test=Chisq) ******  
Likelihood ratio tests of Multinomial Models 
 
Response: Intruder 
                                                            Model Resid. df 
1                                                               1      6105 
2 IDSmodule + Res + V1pk + V2pk + AreaV1on + AreaV2on + AreaV2off      6084 
  Resid. Dev   Test    Df LR stat. Pr(Chi) 
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1   5568.186                               
2   1179.916 1 vs 2    21  4388.27       0 
 
****** anova(fitF, fit14, test=Chisq) ******  
Likelihood ratio tests of Multinomial Models 
 
Response: Intruder 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Model 
1                                                                                                                                                                                         
IDSmodule + Res + V1pk + V2pk + AreaV1on + AreaV2on + AreaV2off 
2 IDSmodule + Cap + Res + V1pk + V2pk + V1pkToIDSoff + V2pkToIDSoff + AreaV1on + 
AreaV2on + AreaV1V2on + AreaV1off + AreaV2off + AreaV1V2off + AreaV1V2_OnOff + 
SDslopeV1_OnOff + SDslopeV2_OnOff + SlopeV1qty + SlopeV2qty + AreaV1_OnOff + 
AreaV2_OnOff 
  Resid. df Resid. Dev   Test    Df LR stat. Pr(Chi) 
1      6084  1179.9159                               
2      6051   917.4638 1 vs 2    33 262.4522       0 
Analysis of Deviance Table (Type II tests) 
 
Response: Intruder 
          LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)     
IDSmodule   146.59  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
Res         156.68  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V1pk        782.75  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
V2pk        612.47  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV1on    221.81  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV2on    357.89  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
AreaV2off   553.05  3  < 2.2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1  
IDS MODEL ADJUSTER - remove next predictor with highest Pr  
[1] "IDSmodule" 
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B.4 ROC, Sensitivity, Precision and Specificity Curves 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: ROC, Sensitivity, Precision and Specificity for model fitF (full model) 
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Figure B.2: ROC, Sensitivity, Precision and Specificity for model fit10 (selected IDS model) 
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Figure B.3: ROC, Sensitivity, Precision and Specificity for model fit14 (lower performance) 
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APPENDIX C. Randomly Selected Components for IDS 
Circuit 
C.1 Capacitors Randomly Selected for IDS Modules 
 
Code Value Mfg Part No Description 
A C10pF VJ0805A100KXACW1BC Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
0805 10pF 50volts C0G 10% 
B C10pF C0805C100M5GACTU Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
50volts 10pF C0G 20% 
C C10pF 08055C100KAT2A Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
50V 10pF 10%  
D C20pF CC0805JRNPO9BN200 Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
20pF 50V NPO 5% 
E C20pF 08051A200KAT2A Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
100V 2pF 10% 
F C20pF GRM2195C2A200JZ01D Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
0805 20pF 100volts C0G 5% 
G C39pF CC0805JRNPO9BN390 CAP CER 39PF 50V 5% NP0 0805 
H C39pF 08051A390JAT2A CAP CER 39PF 250V 5% NP0 0805 
I C39pF GRM21A5C2E390JW01D CAP CER 39PF 100V 5% NP0 0805 
J C100pF VJ0805A101KXBAC Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
100pF 100volts C0G 10% 
K C100pF C0805C101K5GACTU Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
50volts 100pF C0G 10% 
L C100pF 08051A101MAT2A Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
100pF 100V 20% 
M C200pF C0805C201J5GACTU Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
50volts 200pF C0G 5% 
N C200pF GRM2165C2A201JA01D Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
0805 200pF 100volt C0G +/-5% 
P C200pF 08051A201JAT2A Multilayer Ceramic Capacitors (MLCC) - SMD/SMT 
0805 200pF 100volts C0G 5% 
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C.2 Resistors Randomly Selected for IDS Modules 
 
Code Value Mfg Part No Description 
A R84.5K 292-84.5K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 84.5KOHMS 
B R84.5K CRCW080584K5FKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 84.5Kohms 1% 
100ppm 
C R84.5K RK73H2ATTD8452F Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 84.5Kohms 1% 
D R165K 292-165K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 165KOHMS 
E R165K CRCW0805165KFKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 165Kohms 1% 100ppm 
F R165K RK73H2ATTD1653F Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watts 165Kohms 1% 
H R249K 292-249K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 249KOHMS 
I R249K RC0805FR-07249KL Thick Film Resistors - SMD 249K OHM 1% 
J R249K ERJ-6ENF2493V Thick Film Resistors - SMD 0805 249Kohms 1% Tol 
L R64.9K 292-64.9K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 64.9KOHMS 
M R64.9K CRCW080564K9FKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 64.9Kohms 1% 
100ppm 
N R64.9K RK73H2ATTD6492F Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 64.9Kohms 1% 
O R143K 292-143K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 143KOHMS 
P R143K ERJ-6ENF1433V Thick Film Resistors - SMD 0805 143Kohms 1% Tol 
Q R143K CRCW0805143KFKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 143Kohms 1% 100ppm 
R R210K RC0805FR-07210KL Thick Film Resistors - SMD 210K OHM 1% 
S R210K 292-210K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 210KOHMS 
T R210K CR0805-FX-2103ELF Thick Film Resistors - SMD 210K 1% 
U R49.9K 292-49.9K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 49.9KOHMS 1% 
V R49.9K CR0805-FX-4992ELF Thick Film Resistors - SMD 49.9K 1% 
W R49.9K RC0805FR-0749K9L Thick Film Resistors - SMD 49.9K OHM 1% 
X R97.6K 292-97.6K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 97.6KOHMS 
Y R97.6K CR0805-FX-9762ELF Thick Film Resistors - SMD 97.6K 1% 
Z R97.6K RC0805FR-0797K6L Thick Film Resistors - SMD 97.6K OHM 1% 
ZA R21.5K RK73H2ATTD2152F Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 21.5Kohms 1% 
ZB R21.5K 292-21.5K-RC Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/10WATT 21.5KOHMS 
ZC R21.5K CRCW080521K5FKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 21.5Kohms 1% 
100ppm 
ZD R12.4K RN732ATTD1242B25 Thin Film Resistors - SMD 1/10W 12.4Kohm 0.1% 25ppm 
ZE R12.4K 288-0805-12.4K-RC Thin Film Resistors - SMD 12.4K OHM 0.1% 10PPM 
ZF R12.4K TNPW080512K4BEEN Thin Film Resistors - SMD 12.4Kohms .1% 25ppm 
ZG R24.9K ERA-6AEB2492V Thin Film Resistors - SMD 0805 24.9Kohm 0.1% 25ppm 
ZH R24.9K RN732ATTD2492F25 Thin Film Resistors - SMD 1/10W 24.9Kohm 1% 25ppm 
ZI R24.9K RG2012P-2492-B-T5 Thin Film Resistors - SMD 1/10W 24.9K ohm 0.1% 25ppm 
ZJ R45.3K CRCW080545K3FKEA Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 45.3Kohms 1% 
100ppm 
ZK R45.3K RK73H2ATTD4532F Thick Film Resistors - SMD 1/8watt 45.3Kohms 1% 
ZL R45.3K RG2012P-4532-B-T5 Thin Film Resistors - SMD 1/10W 45.3K ohm 0.1% 25ppm 
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C.3 Placement of Components on IDS Modules 
 
  10pF 20pF 39pF 100pF 200pF 
 CAP MFG A B C D E F G H I J K L M N P 
 R MFG                
R84.5K A 1               
 B  2              
 C   3             
R165K D 4               
 E  5              
 F   6             
R249K H 7               
 I  8              
 J   9             
R64.9K L    10            
 M     11           
 N      12          
R143K O    13            
 P     14           
 Q      15          
R210K R    16            
 S     17           
 T      18          
R49.9K U       19         
 V        20        
 W         21       
R97.6K X       22         
 Y        23        
 Z         24       
R165K D       25         
 E        26        
 F         27       
R21.5K ZA          28      
 ZB           29     
 ZC            30    
R49.9K U          31      
 V           32     
 W            33    
R84.5K A          34      
 B           35     
 C            36    
R12.4K ZD             37   
 ZE              38  
 ZF               39 
R24.9K ZG             40   
 ZH              41  
 ZI               42 
R45.3K ZJ             43   
 ZK              44  
 ZL               45 
 
